一九六○年代的美国是个充满理想、挫折、迷惘与暴戾的时代。时代的序幕由肯尼迪入主白宫揭起,当时他四十三岁,是美国有史以来最年轻的总统。新总统标榜 「新境界」(New Frontier),激励全国青年怀抱理想、追求超越。一时之间,政府的保守陈腐之气消失殆尽,取代者乃是文学诗歌之余韵与知识哲学之尊宠。随着「柏林危 机」与「古巴危机」的解除,以及「和平工作团」构想的落实,肯尼迪的声望如日中天,然而一九六三年十一月肯尼迪在德州遇刺,理想主义的梦想遭到无情政治势 力的摧毁,美国从此注定陷入一场折磨不断的噩梦。
一九六○年起,南方黑白种族的冲突日益恶化,黑人民权运动领袖金恩博士在一九六三年八月间号召了数十万群众由各地向华盛顿和平进军,林肯纪念堂见证了少数 族群有史以来最强力的一次示薄雾浓云愁永昼威。一九六玉枕纱厨四年「东京湾事件」后,美国在约翰逊总统的领佳节又重阳导下开始轰炸北越;翌年陆军部队正式投入战场,越战情势全面升高。越战 导致美国政府必须征兵,但年轻的一代拒绝加入名不正言不顺的战争,各地抗东篱把酒黄昏后议示薄雾浓云愁永昼威不断。大学生或者占领校园、捣毁学校与军方合作的研究机构;或者吸毒杂居、 以反东篱把酒黄昏后社会的形式表达他们的愤怒与不满。一九六八年四月金恩被杀,两个月后肯尼迪家族的罗伯.肯尼迪又在竞选总统的过程中遇刺身亡。美国的噩梦已经不只是折 磨,而是战争、反抗、暴力与死亡。这个世代确确实实是美国共和的危机。
汉纳.鄂兰见证了这整个时代的不幸,就如同她在二十几年前见证了极权主义的浩劫一样。当肯尼迪就任总统之时,她的兴奋期待不亚于当时的年轻人。她曾说: 「肯尼迪的处事风格使他的政府截然不同于以往的政权,其差别并不是在于各种政策的追求,而是在于他对政治能有一卓然见解」。这个见解,用鄂兰自己的理论术 语来讲,就是摆脱一切既有意识形态的束缚,而以全新的角度体悟政治行动之无限可能--政治就像人类生生不息的现象所召示的那样,是自由与活力的表征。当肯 尼迪遇刺殒命之后,她也跟多数对美国人一样怀抱椎心之痛目睹他的大殓。随后越战升高,整个美国社会被卷入一场道德的大辩论。在撕裂的美国心灵中,她有时呵 护反越战、反兵役的学生,有时则痛责反抗运动的激烈化与暴力化。他的观察与反省落实于一篇篇的文稿,最后终于结集成为《共和的危机》一书。
在这本书里,鄂兰收录了三篇长文与一篇访问稿。讨论的问题包括美国莫道不消魂军方的越战报告、青年学生的反抗示薄雾浓云愁永昼威、左翼学生运动的暴力理论、以及理想的政治组织形态 等等。就系统性与深度而言,这些论述无法与她的其它大作--如《极权主义之根源》(The Origins of Totalitarianism)、《人之处境》(The Human Condition)、《论革莫道不消魂命》(On Revolution) 等相提并论;但这些文章所触及的都是当时的重要社会问题,而其分析的角度也都是直接出自她的理论性作品,因此它们反而提供一些最具体的范例,点明了鄂兰政 治理论在现实上的活用性。事实上,鄂兰的著述风格一向是超越学院论文与专栏评论二分的藩篱,而以叙事性格鲜明的手法铺陈哲学理论。一九六三年的《艾契曼审 判》(Eichmann in Jerusalem) 已经充分证明了这种写作方式的启发性。因此《共和的危机》所呈现的绝非一般性的专栏文字,而是处处闪现理论关联的「思想演练」(the exercise of thought)。具体地讲,它们都是阐释鄂兰共和主义 (republicanism) 信念的文章,而其切入的方式,则分见于「政治谎言」、「服从义务」、「契约论传统」、「政治权力」、「协议制度」等论点,我们也许可以一一指出其联结方 式。
本书首篇文章是「政治中的谎言」,表面上讨论的焦点是「五角大厦越战报告书」(the Pentagon Papers) 所暴露出来的问题--诸如美国政府迷信一群问题解决专家 (problem-solvers) 以及公关形象专家 (public-relations managers),以致越战政策的错误被掩饰、拖延到无法挽救的地步--,但是实际上问题的关键在于一般人为何会相信政府及专家的谎言。在鄂兰看来,人 类普遍习惯于接受有系统、前后一致的说法。这种心理原本是理性推理所以可能的基础,但是如果失于省察,同样的心理也可以被利用来灌输与事实完全不符的谎 言。因为谎言也者,就是有系统、有条理的捏造与编织。这种编织出来的产物在许多方面都比事实本身显得更有系统、更前后一贯,结果人们反而宁可相信谎言,也 不愿面对例外不断的真莫道不消魂相。在越战期间,美国政府假问题解决专家之助,凭空制造了一个「中俄共人比黄花瘦产集团连手向全球扩张」之说法,然后对中南半岛局势提出了一个 著名的「骨牌理论」,宣称越南若沦入共人比黄花瘦产党之手,则寮国、高棉、泰国等亦将连续失陷。这个理论完全无视当时越战只是越南国内内战的事实,也无视南越政府腐 化不得民心的事实,结果美国在切断骨牌效应的驱策下介入越战,不仅使中南半岛局势恶化,也引发美国本土的长期抗争。当鄂兰着手写作此文时,越战仍未结束, 但美国已兵劳师疲,无心恋战。鄂兰叹息的是谎言永远比事实真莫道不消魂相更具说服力。由于事实真莫道不消魂相来自于人的行动,而行动的本质在于其不可预测、不可规约的创造性, 所以事实总是充满意外,不是任何行为科学理论所能完全掌握。但是人类习惯听信系统严明的理论,这就给谎言制造者一个绝佳的机会,以真假混杂而亳无破绽的理 论去解释过去的行为,并预测未来的趋势。由于他们彷佛已经发现历史的法则,所以他们的的说词就更能打动人心,赢得信任。荒谬的是:这些蓄意欺人的专家由于 太过坚持理论的正确性,最后竟然转而要求未来的事实必须符合理论的预测。当中共还未插入中南半岛情势前,他们预测她一定会插手,因此为了促使这个预测实 现,问题专家乃制造大量中共支持越共的证据,最后中共「果然」出来支持越共。民瑞脑消金兽主社会中的政治谎言就像极权社会中的意识形态,它们都提供了一套虚假的、符 合逻辑的命题来合理化当权者的政策,结果受害的是一般民众。
越战的是非在美国国内引起广泛的争议,而首当其冲的则是适逢征兵年龄的年轻人。认为越战乃不义之战的青年们走上街头,反抗征兵。他们形成了六○年代末期波 澜壮阔的「公民反抗运动」(civil disobedience)。这个社会运动直接挑战了政府权威的正当性,几乎没有一个历经六○年代洗礼的美国学者不会对此经验留下反省的纪录。麦可.瓦瑟 (Michael Walzer)、约翰.罗尔斯 (John Racols) 以及鄂兰都在他们的政治哲学著作中处理了这个问题。鄂兰认为公民反抗运动乃是「一群相当数量的公民,当他们相信改变现状的正常管道已不再起作用,而民怨也 没人听闻没人理会;或是相反地,当政府一意孤行,决定采取某些行动,而其是否合法合宪却大有商榷余地时」,公民就会公然违背政府的法令,以表达他们的质 疑、不满与抗东篱把酒黄昏后议。拒绝应召入伍是违法的、未经同意 ** 是违法的、占据校园破坏军方研究单位是违法的,可是这些行动在「政府本身违宪」的前提下,统统变 成理直气壮的公民反抗运动。
鄂兰明白区分「公民反抗」与「良心反抗」(conscientious objection)。良心反抗是一个人为了宗教或信仰的理由(譬如不杀生),拒绝服兵役以及承担其它政治义务。但是公民反抗不是这种个人性的行为,它是 一种集体的、公开的、以挑战政治权威正当性为目的的社会运动。一般人以苏格拉底及梭罗为公民反抗之典范,因为他们基于良知之召唤,抗拒了国家的要求。可是 鄂兰指出:以良知来合理化公民反抗是不妥的。第一,良知是非常主观的声音,某甲的良知不一定与某乙的良知吻合。当众人皆以良心为政治行动之依据,任何事情 都没有解决的可能。第二,良知也是非常自利性的诉求。良知促使一个人内心取得和谐,但是个人内心平衡与社会福祉是两回事。政治行动必须着眼于公共领域的美 善,而不是一己的解脱得救与否。在这个地方,鄂兰引用的是她在《论革莫道不消魂命》一书中曾经揭示的原则:政治永远不应该受制于道德专衡,政治有政治判准,如果放弃 这些判准以就良知道德,结局总是伪善与挫折。
公民反抗不以良知为合理化之基础,就必须另寻出路。鄂兰提供的途径是契约论传统她希望美国公民要记得这个政府的成立是基于某种同意论的假设,同意不必然以 明示的方式为之,但至少某种默示的同意(tacit consent)是存在的。正是由于人人有权提出异议,适足以证明该政治体系获得了基本的人民同意。「异议蕴含了同意,它是自由政府的标志」。鄂兰以此精 神解读公民的反抗运动,认为当时美国政府已违背了人民对她的托负,因此人民当然有权利反抗。抑有进者,为求永远保障这种反抗权,鄂兰甚至还呼吁大家把抗东篱把酒黄昏后议 群众视为一种特殊形态的自愿结社,而透过增订宪有暗香盈袖法条文的方式,把这个抗东篱把酒黄昏后议权利写进美国宪有暗香盈袖章里去。
「论暴力」一文是本书最重要的一篇文章。当鄂兰在一九六九年单独发表此文时,就已是脍炙人口的佳作。她在这篇文章中反省左翼学生运动所标榜的暴力理论,结 果发展出一个区分暴力与其它力量的重要分类。她首先批评学生运动受到黑人民权运动极端派的主导,扭曲了原先抗争的合理对象,转而沈迷于各式各样的暴力理 论。接着她指出暴力并不是政治行动的本质,政治行动的构成法则是权力 (power)。暴力与权力的区别在于:前者属于工具性的范畴,后者才是目的性的存在。我们一般以为权力是「命令-服从」的宰制关系,而暴力则是其中最激 烈的表现方式。鄂兰说这种想法对错参半,因为暴力确实是「迫使他人服从自己意志」的一种工具性力量,但是权力则与此无关,它是「一切政府的精髓要素」,它 本身就是一个目的。暴力的行使要靠其所追求之目的来合理化,而权力则不需要合理化 (justification)。权力自始存在于政治社群的本质之中,它所需要的只是正当性 (legitimacy)。目的可以合理化手段,所以暴力的理据指向未来即将达成的目的。正当性来自最初成立的宗旨,所以判断权力运行得当与否要回溯至过 去人群聚集成政治团体的时刻。
鄂兰所说的权力令人听来迷惑,这是因为她的权力观念完全不同于一般流行的见解,而是根据古代希腊罗马共和思想所整理出来的一种概念。她说:「权力不仅相当 于人类的行动能力,而且是指协力合作的行动能力;权力绝不可能专属于某一个人,它是属于团体所有。只有当团体聚集在一起时,权力才能够维持存在」。她对权 力的定义其实与她在其它著作中对「行动」与「自由」的界定息息相关。权力萌发于人际之间,是人们集体行动的征象,也是促使公共领域存在的因素。这种权力概 念必然是变动不居、无法衡量的。只有当言语并未流于空洞欺人,而行动也未沦为摧残世界的残酷工具时,权力才算以其原始面貌真实呈现。它不是宰制关系,它是 政治之所以为集体行动的一种质性。
权力不仅与暴力不同,而且与「力量」(strength)、「势力」(force)、「权威」(authority) 等概念也有差别。鄂兰认为在当代功能主义的思考模式下,上述几种概念都被化约为达成统治的相类似手段,然而这种不加细分的作法非常有问题,因为这样会抹煞 掉各种现象的精义,而使人类的生存经验与思考能力趋于单调。因此,鄂兰对它们也做了严格的分判。她说:「力量」是属于个人的东西,是内在于一己体能或人格 魅力的存在,虽然它也向别人展示,但基本上与他人之存在与否无关。至于「势力」,应该是指自然的势力或环境的势力,也就是经由物理过程或社会运动所释放出 来的能量;在日常用语中,人们常常把它与暴力相提并论,但这样并不妥当。「权威」的特色则是无需压迫强制,也无需说服沟通,自然而然使人尊重并愿意服从的 力量;它可以归于个人,也可以归于(政府)机构,甚至于来自传统。
鄂兰担心学生运动误以暴力为权力,其结果只会带来运动本身的毁灭。她同意在某些情况下,无言的暴力是展现义愤、伸张正义的正当手段,但是当义愤指向错误的 对象(譬如以摧毁大学本身来反抗政府),其非理性就无法得到谅解了。因此她极力批驳马克斯 (Marx)、索雷尔 (Sorel)、柏雷图 (Pareto)、博格森(Bergson)、尼釆 (Nietzsche) 以及法农 (Fanon) 等人对暴力的提倡与合理化。在乱世之中,她期盼仍然有人了解政治行动的真义在于自由权力,而不是无限增长的暴力。她的希望终究落空,但是她的反省却以文字 流传了下来。
本书的最后一篇是访问稿。鄂兰在访谈中所讨论的问题多半与前述主题有关。这些问题包括学生运动的本质与兴衰、马克斯主义的错误与社会主义的剥削性、欧洲各 国的政治情势、以及理想国家的概念为何。其中比较有意思的是鄂兰第一次讲出了她心目中理想的政治组织形态。她先是批评了「主权」概念,认为这只是虚幻的发 明,然后她提出了一个取代民族国家的政体形态--协议制度 (council system)。协议制度是参与式民瑞脑消金兽主的落实,它的建构方式是由下而上、人人参与讨论的一种金字塔组织。在每一层级的协议聚会中,鄂兰希望由开放、自由、 充分的讨论,自然而然形成政治意见的领袖,再由这些人代表他们进入上一个协议层级以表达众人之见解,如此一直上推到顶端。鄂兰的协议制度诚然是忠实于其政 治理论的设计,但是其实践上的可能性几乎为零。只是任何追求共和主义精神的人,都不能不思考这类设计该如何改善才能落实。
鄂兰是二十世纪最具创意的政治思想家之一,阅读她的作品永远是一种乐趣。《共和的危机》中文版之发行,有助于读者领会她惊人的创造力与想象力。至于有心深 入鄂兰思想体系的人,或许可以从《人之处境》、《论革莫道不消魂命》、《在过去与未来之间》(Between Past and Future)等三书下手。我们也期待这些作品早日有中文译本出现。
江宜桦
一九九六年十月
Tag-Archive for » 阿伦特 «
May 2008
Apr 2008
Hannah Arendt's Fame Rests on the Wrong Foundation
Article By RUSSELL JACOBY
A street is named after her. Back-to-back conferences celebrate her. New books champion her. Hannah Arendt, who was born 100 years ago this past October, has joined the small world of philosophical heroes. Nor has this attention come to her only since her death in 1975. During her life, she received honorary degrees from Princeton, Smith, and other colleges and universities. Denmark awarded her its Sonning Prize for "commendable work that benefits European culture," also bestowed on Albert Schweitzer and Winston Churchill. When she gave public lectures, students jammed the aisles and doorways.
Arendt fits the bill for a philosophical hero. She was a German Jewish refugee drenched in classical education and worldly experience. With its frequent references to Greek or Latin terms, her writing radiated thoughtfulness. She was not afraid to broach big subjects — justice, evil, totalitarianism — or to intervene in the political issues of the day — the war in Vietnam, civil rights, the trial of Adolf Eichmann. She was both metaphysical and down-to-earth, at once profound and sexy. Alfred Kazin, the New York critic, recalled her as a woman of great charm and vivaciousness — a femme fatale, even.
Yet if her star shines so brightly, it is because the American intellectual firmament is so dim. After all, who or where are the other political philosophers? The last great political American philosopher, John Dewey, died in 1952. Since then American philosophy — with the partial exception of Richard Rorty — has vanished into technical issues; within the subfield of political philosophy, the largest of its figures, John Rawls, remains abstract and insular. His work may quicken the attenuated pulse of academic philosophers, but it does not move the rest of us.
Those thinkers who belong to Arendt's European generation lack her appeal. Take two obvious contenders: Jean-Paul Sartre, who, because of his lifelong extremism and mercurial politics, nowadays evokes decreasing enthusiasm; and Isaiah Berlin, who, because of his extreme caution and unwavering moderation, offers little inspiration. Unlike Arendt, Berlin avoided both political commitment and books on big subjects. (In fact, he never really wrote a book.) While Arendt wrote volumes like The Human Condition, with the subtitle A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man, Berlin wrote essays such as "Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought" and "Two Concepts of Liberty." While Arendt took stands, Berlin waffled.
It is not only the general bleakness that brightens Arendt's star. Her work can sparkle, especially her essays. Yet with the great exception of Eichmann in Jerusalem, her major books suffer from major cloudiness. Ironically, the more philosophical Arendt sought to be, the more opaque she became. Even after the most careful readings, it is difficult to know what Arendt is trying to say. This is as true of The Human Condition as of The Origins of Totalitarianism, the book that first brought her attention. But she is the beneficiary of the widespread belief that philosophical murkiness signals philosophical profundity.
Her devotees sometimes admit that Origins is disorganized and unsuccessful. She sought to present Nazism and Stalinism as twin representatives of totalitarianism, but left out Stalinism until the conclusion. Sections on imperialism and racism, which are coherent and insightful, lack a relationship to Stalinist totalitarianism, which derived from neither. To make her argument, she yoked Nazism and Stalinism together with philosophical babble about ideology and loneliness. Somehow the "loneliness" of the masses fuels totalitarianism. "While it is true that the masses are obsessed by a desire to escape from reality because in their essential homelessness they can no longer bear its accidental, incomprehensible aspects, it is also true that their longing for fiction has some connection with those capacities of the human mind whose structural consistency is superior to mere occurrence." Huh?
Arendt comes by her cloudiness honestly. She was the studentindeed, the loverof Martin Heidegger, the German existentialist who, as one critic quipped, turned the fact of death itself into a professional secret for philosophers. While her liaison with Heidegger has given rise to much high-level gossip — in today's university, Herr Doktor Heidegger's affair with a stunning 18-year-old student would be even more outrageous than his Nazi sympathies — her intellectual loyalties are more the issue. She never conceptually broke with Heidegger and even intended to dedicate The Human Condition to him. She did not, she explained in a letter to him, because things had not "worked out properly between us." She wanted him to know, however, that the book "owes practically everything to you in every respect."
In fact a semireligious Heideggerian idiom of angst, loneliness, and rootlessness informs her work. The masses that supported Hitler (and Stalin) did not suffer from unemployment or hunger, but from "loneliness." Totalitarianism "bases itself on loneliness, on the experience of not belonging to the world at all, which is among the most radical and desperate experiences of man."
To be sure, Eichmann in Jerusalem, her most famous and controversial work, is cut from another cloth; it is lucid and hard-hitting. It is noteworthy that alone of all her books, Eichmann was written under assignment for The New Yorker, where it first appeared, in 1963, as a series of separate essays under the rubric of "Reporter at Large." Perhaps writing for The New Yorker's legendary editor, William Shawn — famous as he was for his ruthless pruning — caused Arendt to shelve her philosophical bombast.
What is also striking about Eichmann in Jerusalem, however, and the phrase it launched, "the banality of evil," is the extent to which Arendt completely changed her mind since her Origins book. In that volume, she concluded that totalitarianism presented the world with something entirely new. Totalitarianism seeks the "transformation of human nature itself." It was a "radical evil," a phenomenon outside of "our entire philosophical tradition. ... We actually have nothing to fall back on in order to understand a phenomenon that ... breaks down all standards we know."
When 10 years later she covered the Eichmann trial in Israel, however, she arrived at the opposite conclusion. Human nature was not transformed; totalitarian evil was not radically new, but utterly pedestrian. "One cannot extract any diabolical or demonic profundity from Eichmann," she wrote. As the often-corrosive philosopher and critic Ernest Gellner put it, "After she had given a kind of account of totalitarianism which was half Kafka's Trial and half Wagner, the ordinariness of Eichmann was bound to strike and puzzle her."
So Arendt's two most famous books make opposite points, since she never reconciled them. Her minions pussyfoot around the contradiction or pedantically try to harmonize the notion of radical and banal evil. Others are less docile. Gershom Scholem, the scholar of Jewish mysticism, protested in a letter to her that her totalitarian book had offered a "contradictory" thesis to her Eichmann report: "At that time, you had not yet made your discovery, apparently, that evil is banal." Arendt agreed: "You are quite right: I have changed my mind and do no longer speak of 'radical evil.'" Her honesty is refreshing but damns her Origins study. It means that her most important book — the Eichmann report — stands unique in her oeuvre; it is not only her least philosophical book, but its notion of evil undermines the theory of her previous work.
Her supporters lack her own forthrightness and try to paper over the fissure. "Against Scholem, who states that radical evil and the banality of evil are contradictory, I want to argue for the compatibility of these conceptions of evil," writes the philosopher Richard J. Bernstein. Never mind that his subject, Arendt, agreed with Scholem. Another scholar suggests that Arendt suffered from a "misunderstanding" of her own work and of Kant's, where the term "radical evil" first appeared. A third resolves the contradiction with the phrase "the banality of radical evil." This expert adopts Arendtian idiom and informs us that "Arendt suggests that the banality of radical evil lies in the disavowal of our own nothingness, our own desolation and impossibility of being."
Arendt's achievement ultimately rests on Eichmann in Jerusalem, as well as some tough-minded essays and thoughtful profiles. On occasion she was woefully off target, such as in her reflections on Little Rock, Ark., where she glimpsed "mob rule" (and a violation of "the rights of privacy") in President Eisenhower's use of federal troops to force school integration. On the other hand, her essays on Zionism and Israel bear rereading. She was a sharp critic of Zionist militarism. She warned in 1948 that an uncompromising Zionism might win the next war but questioned where that would lead. "The 'victorious' Jews would live surrounded by an entirely hostile Arab population, secluded inside ever-threatened borders, absorbed with physical self-defense," she wrote in The Jew as Pariah. Such observations are among her most salient. It speaks volumes about the state of Arendt scholarship that in the recent book by her leading supporter and biographer, those essays go unnoticed. In Elisabeth Young-Bruehl's Why Arendt Matters, which seeks to show her relevance to contemporary politics, Arendt's bold essays on Israel and Zionism do not merit mention, much less discussion.
Arendt once identified herself as a freelance writer and sometimes objected when she was called a philosopher. In fact she might best be situated in the outer circles of the New York intellectuals, those hard-to-pigeonhole writers and critics of the mid-20th century. She was friends with Mary McCarthy, who had been the companion of Philip Rahv and Edmund Wilson, and she contributed to Commentary, Partisan Review, New York Review of Books, Dissent, and of course The New Yorker, the periodicals of the New York intellectuals. Something of the polemical vigor and boldness of the group informs her best work, which are her essays and Eichmann in Jerusalem. Those more than suffice to celebrate Arendt. They are also her least philosophical writings.
Apart from those works, her oeuvre consists of muddy tomes informed by existential jargon. She is lionized today because all of our lions have long been caged and neutered. Isaiah Berlin once commented — he was too cautious to put it in print — that Arendt was the most overrated philosopher of the century. Berlin should know. Even if he shares the honor, he may be half-right.
Russell Jacoby is a professor in residence in the history department at the University of California at Los Angeles. He is the author, most recently, of Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age (Columbia University Press, 2005).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------http://chronicle.com
Section: The Chronicle Review
Volume 53, Issue 16, Page B13
Apr 2008
一
有两种爱:一种轰轰烈烈,惊天动地;一种点点滴滴,细水长流。《神雕侠侣》中的杨过固然偏爱前者;但对于大多数人来说,前者可遇而不可求,后者才是常态。不要小看后一种爱,正是靠着这种相濡以沫,阿伦特(Hannah Arendt)和布吕歇(Heinrich Blücher,本书译为布鲁希尔)搀扶着,携手迈出黑暗时代。
他们相识于1936年的巴黎,相识于异国他乡的流莫道不消魂亡之路。那时,纳粹势力崛起,使得具有犹太血统的她,和身为共人比黄花瘦产党员的他,在祖国无处容身。那时,恐惧萦绕在他们心头,既来自迫东篱把酒黄昏后害,狱中战友彻夜呼喊,也来自动荡,对方无音讯。这样的岁月里,对方是他们内心深处最温暖最柔软的港湾,尽管那时,她有她的丈夫,他有他的妻子。
1939年,战火起,他身陷拘留营,仅仅因为他是德国人。墙内墙外,欲见不能,仅仅因为她不是法莫道不消魂国人。通信是他们唯一的交流渠道。许多双眼睛盯着他们,他的信必须用法文书写,并且通过审查,才能达到她的手中;然而,没有人关心他们的婚姻大事。墙内,他病痛缠身,物资短缺,却仍不忘思念她,鼓励她,安慰她;墙外,不再有人知道她的具体感受,因为她给他的信件已全部遗失于战乱。
天地之大,何处才能允许他们安下小小的一个家?是大洋彼岸的纽约吗?1941年,他们去欧就美,“out of the night”。这一走,自此便将他乡作故乡。人生地疏,经济拮据,语言有碍,一切都要重新开始,亲友亡故的消息频至,初到美国的日子是那样艰难,而彼此之间则更显珍贵。幸好,难民组织和朋友们及时施以援手,助他们度过难关。生活渐渐走上了正轨,他们在拒斥中努力融入新的国度。寒冬之后,春意渐至,暗夜之后,旭日徐升。
她重返欧洲,是在8年之后。她告诉他,她从空中“重见欧洲的第一个国家”,是爱尔兰。当她驻足巴黎街头,“泪水夺框而出”。当她徜徉波恩街头,过去种种涌上心头,“然而,这一切都是错觉!”当她重新踏上柏林的土地,“激动得快要发疯了”。物仍是,而人已非,这就是故国。多年后,在一次电视访谈中,当被问及是否怀念前希特勒时代的欧洲,她回答:“Was ist geblieben? Geblieben ist die Sprache.”(还剩下什么?只剩下语言。)而他,出于对飞机的疑虑,则又隔了12年,才在战后第一次访欧。
二
此时的阿伦特,已不再是当年那个稚嫩的少女,而成长为知名学者:她的著作先后问世,被翻译成多种语言,在各国出版;她多次受邀访问、参加会议;她出访暂住地的邻居们像明星般对待她……而此时的布吕歇,也走向了事业的高峰:他的课程极受学生欢迎,即使是夏季学期出勤率杀手的热浪,也没能驱散他的听众;他被同事们推荐出面摆平学生的静坐示薄雾浓云愁永昼威,原因是他在学生中的好人缘;他被几所学校以高薪争夺……
功成名就的他们,是不是就从此高居广寒、不食人间烟火了呢?不。除了交友圈充斥着学者、作家、报人、出版商等学术文化界名流,除了他们的工作是写作、出书、备课、教学、访问、开会,他们和普通人没什么区别。他们也会抱怨,抱怨同事间拉帮结派,抱怨编辑拖欠稿费,抱怨院长克扣工资,抱怨学校行政管理混乱,抱怨会议冗长无聊,抱怨旅舍昂贵狭小,抱怨出访地人民呆头呆脑,抱怨天气不堪忍受,抱怨家里住进了客人。所不同的是,作为学者,他们有能力在国外用外语和人争吵。最有趣的当属1952年夏,纽约酷热,两口子为是否要安装空调,来来回回讨论了许久,让人忍俊不禁。
正如封底文字所言:“在这本通信集中,我们不仅可以了解到阿伦特的思想渊源,把握她的思想脉络,认识一个作为学者的她,而且我们还可以生动地认识一个作为人、特别是作为女人的她。”作为女人的阿伦特,要为丈夫烧饭,会抹口红,会和女友们交流衣裙打扮,爱买皮包,这时她和普通女子没有任何区别,丝毫不像坊间流传的那般“女博士是灭绝师太”。30多年的书信,为读者还原了一对哲学家伉俪真实的爱与生活。
三
这是一本好书,可惜翻译差强人意。试举例一二:
237页注4:“即美国高校教育的学分体制,一定数量的‘credit’学分既可作为‘艺术系学士’或‘社会学学士’的毕业学分,以后也可作为‘毕业研究’要求的学分。”——布吕歇是哲学教授,带的学生会拿艺术系学士和社会学学士?原来问题出在翻译上:bachelor of arts,文学士,与bachelor of science(理学士)相对,美国学士学位只有这两种。毕业研究,恐怕当译为“研究生研究”。
310页注1:“按照美国英语的说法意思是过去了的就是这些。”——什么意思?其实这是一处语法说明,代词this指代先前提到过的事物。
507页注2:“这里指的是对汉娜•阿伦特的小说《耶路撒冷的橡树人》(五篇,连载)的反应,它们被刊登在1963年2月和3月的《纽约人》上……”——所谓小说《耶路撒冷的橡树人》,分明是艾希曼审判报告《耶路撒冷的艾希曼》(Eichmann in Jerusalem,或译《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》)之误(德语die Eiche意为橡树)。
以上是笔者阅读时发现的疏漏中的一部分,未查阅原文。
[德]罗•科勒尔编:《汉娜•阿伦特/海茵利希•布鲁希尔书信集(1936—1968)》,孙爱玲、赵薇薇译,贵州人民出版社,2004年5月,37元。
(本文承蒙同门好友马华灵指正,特此致谢。)
原载【读品】第51辑
Feb 2008
2005年7月7日,中共组织部第一次亮相于国务院新薄雾浓云愁永昼闻办公室的新闻发布会,受到中外媒体的瞩目。发布会上,中组部副部长李景田坦言,当前中国改革和现代化建设进入关键时刻,并因此发生一些“群体性”事件,他强调,这些事件不是“骚乱”,而只是“群体性”事件。“群体性事件”因此成为当今中国政治和社会词汇中的一个新术语,并已经被当今中国的一些学者所采用。
在构成“群体性事件”术语的两个部分中,“群体”指的并不是所有的“人群”,而是进行抗东篱把酒黄昏后议活动的人群。“事件”指的也不是一切社会的发生,而是那些表达严重不满的集体行动。2005年中国统治权力视线内的“群体性事件”其实是从2003年出现,2004年接着密切发生的“民间维权”的一部分。由于自由言帘卷西风论堵塞、法治不彰和公共舆佳节又重阳论禁声等原因,群佳节又重阳体事莫道不消魂件有越演越暴的趋向。只是当群体抗东篱把酒黄昏后议行为被官方看成是对现有社会、政治秩序的“威胁”时,这类事件才在惊恐中得到了一点重视。至于群体性事件包含着参与者们什么样的正当愿望和诉求,充其量也不过是次要的考虑。
政府重视群体性事件,是因为重视它对当前国家稳定的破坏,部分学界研究群体性事件,是为了找到控制它、疏导它和防止它发生的对策。这两种对待群体性事件的态度都包含着一种非常值得注意的、与毛泽东时代有所不同的群众观。这种新群众观包含着深度的恐惧、惊慌和不安,标志着正在困扰当今中国统治权力的合法性危机意识。它也标志,曾经主导过毛时代政治形态的权力和群众关系已经发生了根本的变化。无论是毛时代的革莫道不消魂命群众理论,还是“告别革莫道不消魂命”的政治保守主义群众理论,都已经无法解释当今中国的民众。新的历史条件向我们提出了重新思考当今中国群众的迫切要求。
要讨论当今的群众问题,就有必要对“群众”概念作一些厘清。“群众”是一个有别于“民众”和“人民”的人群或集体概念。“群众”往往是被自上而下俯视而见的人群。就象不登高就无法乌瞰一样,不俯视便无以统观群众。政治领佳节又重阳导和精英开启之下的“群众”,都是这样俯视出来的。“群众”自称为群众,大多是由于内化了在上者的俯视视角。与“群众”相比,“民众”往往被当作是自然地或现实地存在于社会中的人群,因此也常被称为“人们”。“民众”远不如“群众”那样由高下对比而形成。“人民”可以说是一个国家中最广大意义上的“民众”或“人们”。但“人民”又是一个与统治权力或国家权威合法性联系在一起的全体性人群。“人民”可以指全体国民,也可以指共同面对敌对势力(称为“人民的敌人”)的民众。这时候,“人民”的政治符号意义便十分明显。“群众”和“民众”也都可以用作政治符号。群众由此可以单指“革莫道不消魂命群众”,也就是与领佳节又重阳导一条心,有政治正确性的基层人群;而“民众”则由此可以暗指“民瑞脑消金兽意”或“舆佳节又重阳论”。
我在以下的讨论中,把“民众”当作一个中性词,因为“民众”有两种不同的政治发展可能。第一种可能是被外力不断削弱,不断丧失赖以有机联络的社会纽带:信任、同情和团结。在这种情况下,民众因为失去相互言帘卷西风论和思想交流的公共空间,不断被去社会化,终于沦为散沙原子型的人群。不断去社会化的过程就是不断群众化的过程。民众转化的第二种可能是不断地加强人际关系社会化纽带和交往空间,在经受过“群众化”的摧残之后,有意识地重新社会化。这个重新社会化的过程不再是简单的复元,而是包括有意识地防止未来可能的再次去社会化。这就要求民众自觉地走出目前的“自然”或“现实”秩序,进入“公民”这种用宪有暗香盈袖政法治和民瑞脑消金兽主权利、责任所保障的政治秩序。
一.“事件”和“暴力”
“事件”,正如阿伦特所说,就是那些打乱常规过程和常规程序的事情。正是由于历史中有事件发生,历史才变得不可预测。只是在一个没有任何重要事情发生的世界里,当权者才能随心所欲地规划和预半夜凉初透言未来,“预半夜凉初透言未来只不过是将现今的自动过程和程序投射到未来罢了。也就是说,如果人们无所行动,如果永远没有意外的事情发生,那么未来就能按现在的样子照样延续。人的每一个行动,无论是好是坏,每一件意外的事情,都必然会打乱未来预测的模式。”〔注1〕
在当今中国,群体性事件并不泛指所有的人群的集体行为或活动。政府或单位组织的集体活动无论人数如何众多,也不算是群佳节又重阳体事莫道不消魂件。人们聚集在一起宴会娱乐、体育活动、举行婚嫁或节日庆祝,也都不是群体性事件。“群体性事件”之所以可以用作“群体动帘卷西风乱”的委婉语,那是因为这两种说法的意义内核都是群众的愤怒和不平。这种愤怒和不平是由人们集体感觉到的生存环境恶化而激发的,如强权压迫、权利被剥夺、言帘卷西风论空间被封莫道不消魂杀、冤屈无处申诉、绝望无助等等。生存困境所激发的情绪强烈到一定的限度,便会迸发出来,成为集体行动。这种愤怒和冤屈的迸发在冲破压迫的过程中往往带有暴力和破坏倾向。
“群佳节又重阳体事莫道不消魂件”之所以被当成是一种危险、有害而且可怕的社会现象,主要是因为它有这种暴力和破坏倾向。但群佳节又重阳体事莫道不消魂件对政治秩序的冲击却并不只是在于它可能的暴力。事实上,并不是所有的群佳节又重阳体事莫道不消魂件都有暴力倾向。当个人的不平在人群中转化为集体的愤怒,并向更大的公众揭发社会的不公正时,也就转化为对统治权力有批判性的公共事件或媒体事件。即使它不演化为暴力破坏,专人比黄花瘦制统治权力也很难容忍它的存在。专人比黄花瘦制统治权力往往会夸大群体抗东篱把酒黄昏后议的暴力破坏倾向,为自己实行暴力镇瑞脑消金兽压寻找合理性。从统治的角度来说,谴责暴力比明目张胆地封莫道不消魂杀形成公共事件的公共领域要名正言顺得多。
在当今中国有两个意义层次上的“事件”,一个是指“意外发生的事”,另一个是指这些事件引起公众注意,成为公共事件或媒体事件。中国官方将第一种意义上的事件称作为“突发事件”。只有控制了对突发事件的报道,不让它被世人广泛知晓,它才不至于引起公众注意,不至于成为第二个意义上的公共事件。强行阻止信息流通,控制各种传媒空间,使用的不是直接暴力而是制度暴力(统治制度的结构性暴力)。所谓“依法办事”,它本身就是制度暴力的体现和化身。因此,在对付群众性事件时,官方权力总是同时使用两种暴力,一是在突发性事件发生时,用压倒性的国家暴力迅速扑灭,二是同时使用制度性的强迫禁莫道不消魂令暴力,阻止媒体报道事件,阻止舆佳节又重阳论讨论事件,防止它成为一个公共事件。
群体性事件的背后总是有着实质的利益冲突,尤其是有权者和无权者的利益冲突。它会对现有的政治权威和它的代表造成冲击。造成事件的起动因素往往是有权者自己的暴力行为。于建嵘针对当今中国农村的群体性事件中指出,“利益冲突并不一定会产生政治性的集体行动,只有当这种利益上的冲突以明确的形式表现出来并对一定的权威结构产生根本性冲击时,集体行动才得以发生。在目前农村社会的权威结构中,存在着国家权威和基层党政的权威以及地方权威。在常态中,基层政权作为国家的代表者,其权威处于结构的核心位置,国家权威处于隐性,地方权威属于边缘的民间权威。由于基层党政存在大量的对农民利益侵害行为,基层政权的合法就会受到村民们的怀疑,国家权威就很自然地进入村民们的视野。为寻求国家权威的保护,单个的村民会意识到集体行动的重要,于是,那些能将村民组织起来的地方权威就会迅速膨胀。尽管如此,要使具有制度性意义的权威结构产生动摇,需要有一定的起动因素,这些起动因素主要依赖于具体的诱发性事件。目前,农村最为常见的诱发性事件,基层党政干部在行使职权时的采取暴力等失范行为或因此而产生了诸如死人等严重后果。”〔注2〕于建嵘在“群佳节又重阳体事莫道不消魂件”后面看到了两个要害问题,一是对现有政治权威结构的挑战,二是暴力。由于群体性事件本身可能的暴力倾向和通常引发群佳节又重阳体事莫道不消魂件的外在暴力起动因素,暴力是这两个要害问题中更突出的一个,而权威则是一个关于统治权力合法性的政治理论问题。
二. 暴力和权力
通常,不同政治色彩的政治理论家在暴力和权力关系问题上其实并无分歧,他们都把暴力看成是“权力最显见的展示,”不通过暴力,权力便无以显示它的影响力。韦伯(Max Weber)将国家定义为独自拥有社会中一切合法暴力。〔注3〕米尔斯(C. Wright Mills)说,“一切政治都是权力斗争,而最基本的权力就是暴力。”〔注4〕这些非马克思主义理论家对权力的理解与马克思主义的左派理论非常一致。马克思主义把国家视为统莫道不消魂治阶半夜凉初透级手里的压迫工具,把权力当作暴力的组织化形式。
反抗“权力即暴力”的统治方式,其基本途径之一是从政治理论上把“权力”与“暴力”区分开来,并强调权力的非暴力性。这就需要确立“法”而不是“暴力”的最终权威作用。在古希腊、罗马的传统中,权力是和法,而不是暴力联系在一起的。萨托里(G. Sartori)把法的权威追溯到法原有的正义本源,即法的实质正义所在。他强调,法和正义间的联系是在罗马传统中形成的。法是正义之法,不是苛刑恶法。正义是体现为法的正义,不是抽象的理念和主义。因此,ius(拉丁语中的“法”)和iustum(正义的)是紧紧交织在一起的。在长期的历史过程中,原先指“法”的词,在英、法、意等西方语言中演变成指“正义”的词,“法”和“正确”就变成同一个意思。这种法的观念非常重要,因为法代表的是一个群体关于正义的观念,不是某个统治者所奉行的统治典律。法不仅指那些具有法的形式的规则,而且更指某一种具体的价值内容,一种与正义相匹配的品质。〔注5〕因此阿伦特强调,权力和法的本质不是命令和服从的关系。权力和法治不等于命令,更不等于强迫命令,“十八世纪的革莫道不消魂命正是从这样的历史先例中寻找政治智慧和资源,”形成了一种称作为共和的政体形式,在这种政体中,法治以人民的权力为基础,结束了人对人的统治。人对人的强制权力统治只是一种“与奴役相配的政体。”〔注6〕
共和宪有暗香盈袖政和公民社会强调服从,但那是服从正义之法,而不是服从人。共和宪有暗香盈袖政的服从是对法的支持,公民们既然就法达成了共识,就理应支持法,服从法治。公民对法的支持从来就不是无条件的、无疑问的。公民服从法永远不可能成为那种臣民在暴力胁迫下表现出来的“绝对服从”。一个国家的制度之所以拥有权力,是因为有人民的支持,而这种支持只不过是法的共识的继续。法从一开始就是由公民共识所奠立。在代议政体中,是人民在支配那些管理他们的人。在主权在民的政体中,“所有的政治机构都是权力的显现和体现;一旦活生生的人民权力不再支持这些政治机构,它们也就已经僵化、衰败。”人民的权力体现为舆佳节又重阳论。暴有暗香盈袖政体制可以依赖少数暴力行使者维持,但共和体制则必须依靠“舆佳节又重阳论的力量,”“也就是说,(共和)政府的权力是要依靠众人的,‘维持的人越多,政府的权力越大,’因此,正如孟德斯鸠看到的那样,专人比黄花瘦制是一种最具暴力,但最不具权力的政体形式。”〔注7〕在权力等于暴力的国家里,国家权力是掌权者用帘卷西风枪杆子打下来,并且用帘卷西风枪杆子维持的,一离开枪杆子,掌权者就会惶惶不安。
只有把权力和暴力分开,才能认清民众能如何影响非暴力权力的形成。群众不是一群只能从领袖那里接受权力命令的众人,他们是权力的权威来源。他们是由共同拥有的平等权利、自由意识、参与能力集合到一起的人群,不只是由某些心理素质、思想定势和情绪习惯所自然形成的集体。这个时候,他们其实已经不是群众,而是有公民瑞脑消金兽意识和行为的民众。没有领袖,照样能有民众,没有领袖,民众照样能形成权威,那就是民瑞脑消金兽主法治的权威,政治体制的权威。这个时候的“民众”已经具体化为清晰的个人,即公民。
与“公民”相比,群众是非个体化概念。谈到群众,人们想到的是模糊的一群人。其中每个分子都被虚化和淹没在整体之中,没有姓名,没有面孔,也没有形成独立自主的人格。民众只有成为个体的,享受权利的公民个体才是实在的行动主体。在法治秩序中,只有个体的公民才是可辨认的行为主体。在民瑞脑消金兽主的程序中,只有个体的公民才具有独立的意志和意见。所谓人民瑞脑消金兽主权,也只有落实到个体公民的层面才是实在的。群众与公民的最大不同在于其政治地位。公民是国家的主人,全体公民构成国家的主权者,国家是平等公民的共同体。
三. 暴力强权下的群体反抗
非暴力的权力和公民即国家是共和宪有暗香盈袖政的理念,在中国还未成为现实。群体性事件的行为不是公民行为,而是群众行为,这在当今中国并不奇怪。群体性事件是在共和政治和公民政治缺失的现实条件下发生的集体抗争。这种集体抗争往往因个人愤怒的感情爆发而发生,然而感情冲动的起因并不意味着抗争就一定是非理性的。正如阿伦特指出的那样,“只有当人们有理由怀疑他们的生存环境能否发生变化时,他们才会感到愤怒。只有当人们的正义意识受到侵犯时,他们才会有愤怒的反应。这种反应不一定是因为愤怒者本人受到了个人伤害。(它也可能是旁观者的愤怒。)整个革莫道不消魂命的历史都让我们看到,往往是上层阶半夜凉初透级的成员发动并领佳节又重阳导被压迫被践踏的下层民众进行反抗。”〔注8〕没有为他人的不幸而起的愤怒,也就没有正义的社会舆佳节又重阳论,更不会有反抗行为。
遇到不公正的事情,“保持冷静,”凡事不动声色,袖手旁观和克己忍让并不能提升理性。阿伦特同意乔姆斯基的看法,认为在社会不公正事件发生时,保持超然和平静,其实是一种可怕而且可悲的态度。她完全赞同乔姆斯基对越战中一些知识分子的批评,这些知识分子坚持所谓中立学术立场,在政治问题上采取模棱两可的回避态度。乔姆斯基认为,他们不过是在用一种“学术冷峻和伪科学外表”掩盖实质性的精神和道德空白。〔注9〕
阿伦特强调,情绪本身具有理性判断的价值,“要想能(对现实)作出理性反应,人首先就需要被‘感动’。情绪的对立面不是理性,……而是无动于衷或滥情。无动于衷常常是一种病理现象,而滥情则是感情的乖张反常。”〔注10〕没有情绪反应,没有正义冲动并无助于提升社会理性。恰恰相反,当今中国的普遍道德冷漠、无所行动、犬儒麻木,正是社会缺乏理性的明显症兆。而官方所采取的种种压制措施正在进一步加剧和扩大这种社会疾病。纳粹的德国、斯大林的苏联、毛泽东的中国都培养了大批的法西斯打手和大批的麻木旁观者。
在权势当道,法治不彰,社会正义没有制度保障的情况下,“在人们遭遇不平的事件或状况时,极有可能诉诸暴力,那是因为暴力的效果直接而快捷。”以思考的慢速度采取行动和因愤怒而快速行动是两码事,但后一种行动也有它自己的缘由,“在私人生活和公共生活中,常常出现这样的情况,暴力行为因为有快速的效果而成为唯一恰当的解决方式。这不是说暴力行为让人解恨消气(敲桌子打门也可以帮人解恨消气),而是说在某些情况下,暴力行为(不通过言语辩论,也不考虑后果)会成为立即伸张正义的唯一方式。”〔注11〕斯考特(James C Scott)在《统治和抵抗的技艺》一书中指出,由于在上者和在下者实力的悬殊,在下者心里十分明白自己硬斗不过在上者,因此决不会一开始就去鸡蛋碰石头。自下而上的抗东篱把酒黄昏后议都是循规蹈矩的,都是以“申诉”、“请愿”和“反映情况”来争取在上者的善待。“农民上诉往往是……动帘卷西风乱和闹瑞脑消金兽事的先声,”只是在完全走投无路的情况下,他们才会铤而走险,犯上作乱。〔注12〕他们所运用的是一种“绝望暴力”,一种连暴力者自己都知道也许是达不到目的的暴力。这种暴力甚至会以暴力者自己为对象(自杀或同归于尽)。
在下者的绝望暴力往往是在上者的绝对暴力逼出来的。绝望暴力(自有暗香盈袖焚、自杀)的存在应当成为一种警戒,让全社会的人都高度重视绝对暴力的存在。绝对暴力并不是许多工具暴力的简单相加。绝对暴力是一种突进,一种中断,它不是达到某个目的的手段。它以维持它自己为目的。绝对暴力是一种绝对堕落的暴力,这就象丧失政治自由意义的革莫道不消魂命,一旦只是为权力而权力,就会成为败死和堕落的革莫道不消魂命。随着革莫道不消魂命的败死,堕落的暴力成为绝对暴力,革莫道不消魂命也就沦落为极权专人比黄花瘦制。然而,即使是绝对暴力也不得不用工具性理由来装扮自己。例如,1957年的反右以及秋后算帐的惩罚、劳莫道不消魂改和流放,针对的是那些敢于对现实有批评言帘卷西风论的人(当然还牵连许多根本没有批评言帘卷西风论的人们)。绝对暴力的工具性理由是“击败敌人的猖狂进攻”。文瑞脑消金兽革中的绝对暴力更为乖张,也更明显,成为一种笼罩各色人等的恐怖。发表于1966年9月22日的“革莫道不消魂命大字报”《红半夜凉初透色恐佳节又重阳怖万岁》集中而典型地表现了那种为暴力而暴力的极端恐怖,但它仍然是以“捍卫毛主人比黄花瘦席革莫道不消魂命路线”的工具性目的来为这种暴力恐怖张目。
即使在文瑞脑消金兽革结束后三十年的今天,绝对暴力仍然是一个飘荡在中国的幽灵。绝对暴力不再表现为随意进行的批斗和抄家,也不表现在时时处处的“阶半夜凉初透级斗争”。新的绝对暴力表现在完全没有明确目标的言帘卷西风论钳制和公共信息封莫道不消魂锁上。这种钳制和封莫道不消魂锁可以由任何一级的党权机构不经任何立法程序随意决定。例如,2006年7月重庆市公半夜凉初透安局作出《关于加强国际联网备案管理的通告》,规定10月30日前必须完成,拒绝执行者罚款3000元并停机6个月。新绝对暴力的惩罚不一定象旧绝对暴力那样以肉体为对象(折磨、囚禁),而以经济惩罚和自由权利限制为主要手段。新绝对暴力也是绝对的权力显示,是否能有效达到设定的目的并不重要。这是一种典型的为权力而权力,为强迫而强迫。例如,为全面控制网络信息的“金盾工程”,它的作用与其说是真正能全面有效地消除人们在网络上发泄的不满和愤怒,还不如说是宣示统治权力全面控制公共信息、剥夺民众的知情权、蔑视民众隐私权的决心。有报道称,这项“工程已经耗资数百上千亿人民币”(具体数字当然因为“保密”而不得而知)。
控制是否会有效,本应是工具性暴力的考量因素之一。但是,绝对暴力是一种不计手段和目的逻辑的暴力,手段的有效性远不如宣示暴力来得重要。暴力的网络控制完全不考虑人心成本,明明知道封闭网站会激起公愤,但照样一个一个强行封去。〔注13〕
四. 不要让暴力在社会中扩散
人们越无法用言帘卷西风论进行抗争,也就越有可能转向暴力。即使不直接参与暴力的人也可能因此越加同情那些有暴力抗争行为的群体性事件。但是暴力抗争却并非社会之福。反抗性质的暴力行为虽然暂时可能成为申张正义的方式,成为“复仇”的手段。但是,暴力复仇,为正义而自行执法,与现代文明群体的约法制度不合,这是毋庸讳言的。它更不是政治解决的手段。暴力是一种手段,不是目的。暴力是否有效,要看它能否达到它预期的目的。目的分两部分,一部分是实际利益或实用目的(如能否讨回薪资、保住住宅、得到赔偿、平反昭雪、满足要求,等等)。另一部分是道义价值,道义价值不能由暴力自己来实现,必须通过公共政治才能实现。
由于社会正义和恢复正义正当途径(法治制度)的缺失,人们被迫诉诸暴力解决问题。暴力也许可以帮助达到这一目的,但这目的本身的道义性并不来自暴力,“暴力的理性在于它对某个短期目标的合理追求,但暴力并不是这个目标之所以合理的理由。暴力也不会提升人们对这一目标的认同,这就象革莫道不消魂命暴力本身并不会,至少不应当使人们更向往革莫道不消魂命。正相反,革莫道不消魂命经常诉诸的暴力手段常常使那些本来同情革莫道不消魂命价值理想的人也会惧怕革莫道不消魂命,疏远革莫道不消魂命。但是,暴力却确实可以起到将社会不公引起公众注视的作用。”〔注14〕
暴力只是局部的修正,不可能有彻底的改变。如果能达到目的,充其量不过是短期目的。奥布兰(William O'Brien)在讨论十九世纪爱尔兰民族主义者暴力反抗事件时指出,有时候,“为了争取稍好一些的待遇,暴力是唯一可行的手段。”暴力能起一些作用,但这种作用所引起的改变在性质上有极大的局限。阿伦特指出,“如果(暴力抗争)的目的不能迅速达到,那么后果不仅是目的的挫败,而且是就此将暴力行为引入整个社会政治。”〔注15〕对群众暴力的镇瑞脑消金兽压会越加严酷,手段会越加凶险。反抗则需要加倍诉诸暴力,形成恶性循环,“(暴力)行为的后果是不可逆转的,(暴力抗争)行为失败后,几无可能回到原来的现状。和一切其它行为一样,暴力行为(在没有达到目的的情况下,也会)改变现实世界,这是一种使世界变得更暴力的改变。” 暴力标志着有话语能力的人向没有话语能力的野兽退化,不只是个人的退化,而且是整个社会文明和政治文明的退化。〔注16〕
在当权者个人无须独自担负政治责任的专人比黄花瘦制国家里,群体暴力反抗的社会成本特别高昂。由于反抗的报复对象不可能具有明确性,它更有可能造成盲目的攻击和破坏。愤怒和暴戾很可能令人丧失理性,那是因为愤怒者把愤怒发泄到了本不是对象的对象身上。当愤怒发泄在“替代对象”身上时,它必定沦落为非理智的仇恨。这种非理智的仇恨特别容易发生在缺乏公共思考和讨论的社会环境中,一旦发生就会无止境膨胀。这种非理性的仇恨很容易被统治者利用敌我意识形态(如民族主义)来加以分化和利用,故意转移目标。
当今中国的专人比黄花瘦制官僚统治正是一种无个人面孔的体制性统治,一方面是无处不在的“党天下”,另一方面则没有一个具体的党领佳节又重阳导需要担负明确的个人政治责任。权大无边的个人藏在制度、法规、机构后面,更加可以为所欲为,无所顾忌。政党统治越是拒绝轮替,就越是不容公共监督,它的官僚体制也就越是僵化顽固。这样的“党领佳节又重阳导”本身就是一种官僚体制的别名,制度性官僚专人比黄花瘦制是一切统治中最可怕的。制度性官僚专人比黄花瘦制之所有成为阿伦特所说的“最专横的专横统治”形式, 是因为它的权力不是集中在某一个领袖手里,而是分散在一帘卷西风党统治的整个体制之中。它不再可能因为领袖的更替而发生剧烈的改变。制度性官僚专人比黄花瘦制必然带来体制的进一步腐佳节又重阳败,因为领袖的个人意志对改变整个体制道德素质已经不再具有实质性的影响力量。
君主或寡头政体是一个人或少数人对绝大多数人的统治;贵族政体是优秀者对低劣者的统治;民瑞脑消金兽主政体则是多数人对所有人的统治。而在所有这些政体形式后面,还要加上一种最可怕的统治形式,那就是制度性的官僚统治。这是一种无人的统治形式,它由一套精致复杂的制度、机构、法规来维持。在这个统治机器中,每个握有大小权力的人都不过是这一权力的临时掌管人,都不过是一个可以由任何他人置换的“工作人员”,“在官僚制度中,为事件负责的既不是一个人,也不是最优秀的那些人,既不是少数人,也不是多数人,官僚制度最确切的称呼应当是‘无人统治’。”〔注17〕官僚专人比黄花瘦制比个人专人比黄花瘦制更趋向于使用国家暴力,不只是军队、警薄雾浓云愁永昼察的暴力,而且还有恶法的暴力。官僚体制不象独半夜凉初透裁者个人那样需要顾虑他自己的威望、名誉或历史地位。正因为官僚体制无须承担个人责任,它可以更加大胆作恶,成为名副其实的群体性作恶。
公共生活越“官僚化”,暴力行动的吸引力就越大。在官僚体制化的专人比黄花瘦制统治下,你有冤屈,但却找不到一个具体实在的人可以与之争辩,对之申诉,对之施以压力,以求改变。官僚体制是一个让人人都当奴隶的体制,“在官僚体制这种政体中,每个人都被剥夺了政治自由,被剥夺了行动的能力。无人的统治并不是不统治,尽管所有的人都同样无能为力,但人们仍然有一个没有暴君的暴有暗香盈袖政。”〔注18〕无暴君的暴有暗香盈袖政使得反抗暴有暗香盈袖政失去了直接的对象,也使反抗的愤怒迷失了真实方向,反抗的暴力因此变得更加盲目,更加容易伤及无辜。
人们因政治家的虚伪狡诈、不择手段和工于心机而讨厌政治,因权力的恐怖、暴虐而讨厌权力。同样道理,人们也因为人群的盲从冲动、弱智短视和一哄而起而鄙视群众,因群体行为的暴戾难控而恐惧群佳节又重阳体事莫道不消魂件。其实,暴力既不是政治权力的本质,也不是群佳节又重阳体事莫道不消魂件的本质。在共和宪有暗香盈袖政、民瑞脑消金兽主法制的环境中,政治权力和民众参与都不仅可以是非暴力的,而且可以是反暴力的。暴力的政治权力统治和暴力的群众运动都是在特定的历史传统和政治文化条件下形成的,它们都会对政治文化和社会文化造成极严重的长久性破坏。
暴力行为和非暴力行为所诉求的心理机制不同。暴力行为为获得成功,必须鼓励对敌方的仇恨和残忍,因此,暴力行为在本质上焕发人性中的“恶”。但是,非暴力行为则力图以自己的理性来焕发对方的理解和同情,从而唤醒被贪欲、虚荣和暴戾所迷障的人的良知。生存困境愤怒越是集聚在个人或小集体心中,越是不能通过公共空间的交流讨论形成症结性的共识,越是不能通过法治途径得到理性而公正的解决,就越是可能引爆局部的群体暴力。任何一个国家,总有不同的意见和矛盾冲突,统治者总能找到合适的理由去强制压服。专人比黄花瘦制统治以暴力、恐怖的手段实现自己的目标,注定不能达成一个被整个社会接受的合理结果。如果不幸激发大规模民间抗争,势必导致整个国家陷入以暴易暴的恶性循环之中。
注释:
1. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970, p. 7.
2. 于建嵘: 在农民反抗的背后——湖南农村群体性事件的调查和分析,http://www.tecn.cn,2004.10.30。
3. C. Wright Mills. The Power Elite. New York, 1956, p. 171.
4. Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation.” In Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford university Press, 1946, p. 78.
5. Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revised. Part Two: The Classical Issues. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987, p 322.
6. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence, p. 40.
7. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence, p. 41.
8. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence, p. 63.
9. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence, p. 64.
10. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence, p. 64.
11. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence, pp.63-4.
12. James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 93-5.
13. 即便是这种乖张的绝对暴力仍然需要一些工具性的理由,如加强公半夜凉初透安运作的信息化,打击犯罪,维护治安,保障社会稳定,等等。《公半夜凉初透安部信息通讯局总工马晓东讲话》2003/9/13,www.it.sohu.com〕
15. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence, p. 80.
16. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence, p. 80.
17. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence, pp. 38-9.
18. Hannah Arendt, On Vilence, p. 81.
原刊《二十一世纪》2007年8月号,作者授权天益发布。本文转自天益网徐贲专栏。
Jan 2008
汉娜· 阿伦特(Hannah Arendt)1906年出身于德国汉诺威一个犹太人家庭,在马堡和弗莱堡大学读哲学、神学和古希腊语;后转至海德堡大学雅斯贝尔斯的门下,获哲学博士学位。1933年先是流莫道不消魂亡巴黎,1941年到了美国,1951年成为美国公民。同年,《极权主义的起源》一书出版,为她奠定了作为一个政治理论家的国际声望。
流莫道不消魂亡之前,阿伦特以一个犹太人的身份协助犹太组织工作,为此曾被纳粹政府关押过。去美国之后,她为流莫道不消魂亡者杂志《建设》撰写评论等;做过肯舍出版社的编辑;1952年担任过"犹太文化重建委员会"的负责人。自1954年开始,阿伦特在美国加利福尼亚大学、普林斯顿大学、哥伦比亚大学、社会研究新学院、纽约布鲁克林学院开办讲座;后担任过芝加哥大学教授、社会研究新学院教授。随着《人的状况》、《在过去与未来之间》、《论革莫道不消魂命》等著作的出版,使她成为二十世纪政治思想史上的瞩目人物,近年来声誉日隆。
1975年12月阿伦特因心脏病突发去世。
主要著作:
1、《极权主义的起源》(The Origins of Totalitarianism)1949年写成,1951年初版名为《我们时代的负担》(The Burden of Time);1958年再版时增加了一个结论性的《意识形态与恐怖》,书名也改成《极权主义的起源》。该书以纳粹的种族灭绝作为主要分析对象;指出那是一种人类历史上从未有过的新的统治形态,它把一部分人视为天生理应消灭的"种类",进行集体的改造和屠有暗香盈袖杀;过去的专人比黄花瘦制政权仅限于迫东篱把酒黄昏后害它的"政敌",而极权主义却无情地消灭它的"顺民";它甚至公然鼓吹和践踏人的道德信条,使得撒谎、做伪证、对他人行使暴力等做法畅通无阻。而这样一种新的面貌,是建立在一套意识形态推理之上的。这套逻辑将人类过去、现在与未来解释为一个封闭的整体,它有一个自己要去的"终极目标";为了这个目标的实现;可以对现实世界进行任意的改造,于是一部分人便承当其这个改造的执行者。阿伦特描述了历史上的"反犹主义"、十九世纪以来的"帝国主义"扩张心态、以及资本主义的生产方式如何造就了现代社会一大批"孤独"、"无力"、自感"多余"的人,所有这些形成了极权主义暴有暗香盈袖政产生的土壤。尤其是后者,一心追逐物欲满足的"原子"般的个人,与他人隔绝即意味着隔绝了使得人们的生活富有意义的共同世界;在丧失现实感的同时,丧失了对于周围世界健全、正当的判断,所以非常容易被尘嚣甚上的强权势力所左右。
2、《人的境况》(The Human Condition),1958年出版,德文版名为《积极生活》( Vita Activa)。作为海德格尔的学生,阿伦特在这本书中在对海德格尔的思想做比较彻底清算的同时,建立了自己著名的"行动理论":强调人只有在与他人分享这个世界、共同拥有这个世界并在这个世界中积极行动,才能使人获得意义。这样的立场被称之为翻转了西方哲学几千年推崇"沉思"的传统。
在这本书中,阿伦特区分了人类实践的三种形式和与之相适应的三个领域。一、"劳动"(labor)。劳动的主要目标是为了维持肉体的生存和延续,它所生产的生活必需品,"一生产出来就被消费掉了"。在这个意义上,劳动具有一种与外界无关的"黑暗"和"隐秘"的性质。"二、"生产"(work)。"生产"包含了技能、技巧在内;所生产出来的东西尽可能避免被迅速消费掉,因而具有一种持存性,在时间上更为悠久。但如果把这种"实用的"、"制作经验的普遍化"的活动当作衡量事物的唯一标准,恰恰是以"无意义"取代了"意义";"手段被当作了目的"。如果说"劳动"构成了仅仅与自己身体存在有关的"个人领域",那么,"生产"则构成了现代以降的"社会领域"--人们为了"生产"而结成某些社会关系(如经济关系),从表面上看,在这个领域中人们彼此结合在一起,不像在劳动状况下个人处于与世隔绝的状态,但它本质上仍然是服务于自然的生命过程,仍然是为生存的目的组织起来的。因此它是一个私人领域和公共领域之间的"雌雄同体的领域"。三、行动(action)。"行动"是在公共领域中展开的,在公共领域中的行动意味着:排除了任何仅仅是维持生命或服务于谋生目的,不再受到肉体性生命过程那种封闭性的束缚。"行动"是由于别人的在场而激发的,但却不受其所左右,它存在一种"固有的不可预见性",因而在公共领域中,人和人处于最大限度的开放之中,人们互相能够看见和听见,他人的在场保证了这个世界和人们自己的现实性,使得一个人最大限度地表现了自己的个性和实现自己的最高本质。"行动"的一个重要方面是"言谈",在言谈中人们敞开他自己,阐释和展现自己。言谈本身具有巨大的政治意义:如果不是想要直接动用暴力,那么,言谈所具有的措辞和劝说便是政治方式本身。总之,在一个亮起来的公共舞台上勇于发言、挑战和接招,一个人表达了他的尊严。
3、《在过去和未来之间》(Between Past and Futuer)1961出版,这是一本论文集,主要写于五十年代。在写完《极权主义的起源》之后,阿伦特意欲继续进行此项研究,尤其关注在马克思主义和斯大林主义中的极权主义因素。此后该计划中断,但所形成的思想写成收在该书的若干单篇文章当中。其中包括《什么是自由》、《什么是权威》、《真理和政治》、《传统和新时代》、《宗教与政治》、《自由与政治》、《教育危机》等。从这些文章中,发展出阿伦特后来更为成熟的政治思想的所有议题,提供了理解她此后思想脉络的雏形,犀利而富有原创性,被人称之为了解阿伦特最重要的三本书之一(另外两本是《人的状况》和《论革莫道不消魂命》。)
4、《艾克曼在耶路撒冷-一一件平庸无奇的罪恶的报道》(Eichmann in Jerusalem A Report on the Banality of Evil),1963年出版。艾克曼1906年生,曾在屠有暗香盈袖杀犹太人中扮演重要角色,战后化名逃往阿根廷,1960年被以色列特工抓获,1961年在耶路撒冷对其举行了刑事审判。阿伦特作为《纽约客》的特派记者前往报道该审判,最终形成了这本书。从阅读有关卷宗开始,到面对面冷眼观察坐在被告席上的艾克曼,以及听他满嘴空话地为自己辩护,阿伦特断定被人们描绘成一个十恶不赦的"恶魔"的这个人,实际上并不拥有深刻的个性,仅仅是一个平凡无趣、近乎乏味的人,他的"个人素质是极为肤浅的"。因此,阿伦特提出的一个著名观点是:"平庸无奇的恶。"他之所以签发处死数万犹太人命令的原因在于他根本不动脑子,他像机器一般顺从、麻木和不负责任。她再次运用极权制度的意识形态性质来分析这样一个平庸无奇的人为什么卷入深渊般的恶而无法自拔,问题在于纳粹通过使用新的"语言规则"来解说他们的反常行为:"灭绝"、"杀掉"、"消灭"都由"最终解决"、"疏散"、"特殊处理"来表达。对于追求观念的人来说,"一切都是可能的。"在这本书中,阿伦特对于犹太人在历史上处于边缘状态的"无根基性"、"无政治性",以及犹太组织的领佳节又重阳导的消极做法提出了直言不讳的批评,导致了这本书的出版引起了轩然大波。尽管对审判的结果同样表示满意,但阿伦特对审判的性质和过程还是表达了疑问--"审判的目的是表现正义,而不是别的",不是"复仇"及展示"耻辱"。这种眼光超出了对于种族和地方的认同,她着眼的不是受害者,而是行为本身。在这个意义上,阿伦特认为艾克曼应为他的"反东篱把酒黄昏后人类罪"而不是"反犹太人罪"受审。
5、《论革莫道不消魂命》(On Revolution)1963年出版。这是阿伦特一部重要的政治理论著作,表达了她"自由宪有暗香盈袖政的共和主义"思想。首先,阿伦特从分析了在"革莫道不消魂命"这个人类创造性活动中所包含的难以逃脱的悖论,她称之为"自由的深渊":一方面,革莫道不消魂命意指砸碎枷锁、推翻旧体制;但是另一方面,革莫道不消魂命同时意味着要建立新的秩序,而且通常被说成是"前所未有"的"新天新地"。对于革莫道不消魂命者来说,它所带来的一个难题是--当革莫道不消魂命推翻旧体制而着手建立新体制时,革莫道不消魂命者如何继续保证它的最初的原创性或自由发挥力?经常出现的情况是革莫道不消魂命者最终变成了吞噬自己子女的恶魔。比这个问题更棘手的是,由不受既定传统束缚、揭竿而起的革莫道不消魂命所建立起来的政权如何说明自己的正当性?从什么样的资源可以取得它的合法性论证?解决的办法往往是赋予这个新的创制一种更高超、更绝对的根据,这个绝对根据可以是古代的"圣人"、"伟大的立法者"、"自然法和自然法的上帝"(民族的"普遍意志"),但以权威之外的权威来解释其正当性,这是一个恶性循环。
阿伦特继而将法莫道不消魂国革莫道不消魂命和美国革莫道不消魂命加以比较。法莫道不消魂国革莫道不消魂命期间,西耶尔(Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes1748--1836)第一次提出了"制宪权"的问题,按照他的解释,"制宪权"不仅存在于"国家宪有暗香盈袖政权力"之外,而且先于"国家宪有暗香盈袖政权力"的存在,因此才有了正义的基础。针对西耶尔的意见,阿伦特指出:"制宪权"的主体(不论是"人民"还是"民族"),都不具有宪有暗香盈袖政性格,因此他们不拥有任何权威,从而实现想要实现的事情。具体到法莫道不消魂国的"宪有暗香盈袖政大会",阿伦特指出,它本身"既然先于宪有暗香盈袖政,就缺乏宪有暗香盈袖政性格,也不可能转变成为宪有暗香盈袖政本身。"因此,新宪有暗香盈袖政如何具有合法性仍然是个问题。在这种情况下,必然会引导出一种绝对性原则,以证明确立本身及其立法的正当性和合法性。西耶尔最终把"制宪权"根植于"自然状态"的"民族"之内。接着事情发生戏剧性的转折:当把民族定位为"多数"时,同时又把这"多数"解释为受贵族和教士阶层所压迫的"第三等级",进而肯定"第三等级"由于受压迫而而具有了某种"特权"能够成为"制宪权"的主体。当罗伯斯比尔喊道:"共和制?君主制?我只知道解决社会问题"时,这场革莫道不消魂命的目标产生偏移,不再是建立"自由宪有暗香盈袖政"的新秩序,而是变成了一场社会性的悲情控诉:对于民间的同情、对于贫困不幸者的同情成了政治品格;深邃无涯的悲悯转而成为新体制之大仁大德的证明。阿伦特分析道:同情只是在针对某个人的时候才可能;针对大众则就变成了抽象的、对民族产生灾难性影响的东西。当整个民族的苦难破坏了对于同情的克制能力,由此便产生了意欲以极端手段来铲除不幸的倾向。这时的悖论在于--有人出于同情和对人类的爱而随时滥杀无辜。
美国革莫道不消魂命的过程完全不同。首先,美国物质条件的优裕免除了由社会贫困带来的一系列问题--物质匮乏所导致的个人的封闭性("被排除在公共领域之外的不透明性")、同情不幸者引发的"美德之恐怖"、暴力及军事独半夜凉初透裁等等;从而能够致力于建立将更多的声音吸纳进来的民瑞脑消金兽主机制。制宪者们是从各市镇之议会推选出来的代表,同样承受着来自"下方"的压力,但却不是从任何主观之心境、意志、品德开始,也不去寻找一个绝对性的原则作为源泉或合法性论证;正是制宪和创制活动本身已经承担了宪有暗香盈袖政构成的权威,体现了"前宪有暗香盈袖政"政治社会中不同的、次级的组织体(各市的议会及各州的自制法规),它们因人民的认可而具有制度上的权威性。随后,是在已有的"宪有暗香盈袖政构成"的社会之上建立一个联合各州的权威的联邦共和制。因此。这个新共和体制自我正当性论证基础正在于保存和持续这个已经由人民自发性构成的多元的政治社会,在于其中各种不同的、由人民承认的因而具有权威性的制度。与欧洲现代国家仍然以统一、不可分割的主权为基设不一样的是,美国宪有暗香盈袖政所确立的国家以"权力的结合"为取向而形成"联邦"原则。
6、《黑暗时代的人们》(Men in dark times),1968年出版,这是一本"知人论事"的文集,"人物素描"占了主要篇幅,他们大多是阿伦特的同时代人及朋友,同她一样经历和见证了时代的不幸和苦难。其中的篇目包括:《思考莱辛--论黑暗时代的人们》,(阿伦特1959年获汉堡莱辛奖的致辞);《罗莎·卢森堡1871--1919》;《卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯》;《以萨克·丹尼森1885--1963》、《瓦尔特·本雅明1892--1941》、《《兰德尔·贾雷尔1914--1965》、《海尔曼·布洛赫1886--1951》、《瓦尔德马尔·古里安》等。对阿伦特理论持批评态度的人指出在阿伦特的政治思想中,渗入了太多美学因素;这些文章尤其表明,在洞察世事、了解人性方面,阿伦特是如何敏锐、犀利并充满人情味。
7、《共和危机》(Crises of the Republic )1972年出版。该书由三篇长文章和一篇访谈组成,是阿伦特对于六十年代美国社会的观察、沉思的结果。第一篇文章题为《政治中的谎言》(Lying in politics),该文通过讨论"五角大楼越战报告"所暴露出来的问题--美国政府迷信问题专家和公关形象专家,乃至越南政策的错误一再延误,揭示了一般人为什么会相信政府及专家的谎言。原因在于人类普遍习惯接受系统的、前后一致的说法。这种心理原本是人类理性推理之所以成立的基础,但是如果失之省察,它也可以被用来灌输与事实不符的谎言。谎言也是有系统、看似严密和有条理的捏造和编织。这种编织的结果会比事实本身更严密和贯穿一致,结果是人们宁愿相信谎言而不是事实。民瑞脑消金兽主社会的政治谎言正像极权社会中的意识形态,它们都提供了一套虚假的、看似符合逻辑的说辞来合理化当权者的政策。第二篇文章题为《公民不服从》(Civil Disobedience),这是阿伦特对于60年代后期美国社会包括反对越战在内的社会运动的有力分析。年轻人走上街头,反对征兵,公然违背了政府的法令,但表现出来的却是如此理直气壮。阿伦特区别了"公民反抗"和"良心反抗"性质上的不同。"良心反抗"是出于个人内心的要求(个人信仰、信念等),以一个人的内心平衡作为准绳,说到底将事情归结为个人的;"公民反抗"的不同在于它是一种集体的、公开的、以挑战政治权威的正当性为指归的社会运动,着眼于公共领域中的"善"而不是一己的"善";落实到公共事务的改善而不是个人的解脱。在这个意义上,以良心的要求来取代政治的标准是远远不适当的。与这篇文章站在"反抗"一边呼吁"反抗权"不一样的是,在另一篇《论暴力》(On violence)中,阿伦特表达了对于左翼学生运动中暴力倾向的忧虑。该文曾以单行本于1969年刊出,随即引起高度重视。阿伦特首先指出暴力并不是政治行动的本质,区分了暴力与权力如何从根本上性质不同;真正的政治行动的目标远非暴力,而在于自由权力。阿伦特继而区分了"暴力"(violence)、"力量"(strength)、"势力"(force)、"权威"(authority)等概念,指出在当代功能主义思考模式下,这些概念都被化约成达到统治的类似手段;但这样做只能使得人类生活的经验趋于单调。该书最后一篇是1970年接受德国作家阿得贝尔特·莱夫的采访,题为《关于政治和革莫道不消魂命的思考》。
8、《心智人生》(The Life of Mind),这本书原计划由三个部分组成《思考》(thinking)、《意志》(willing)、《判断》(judging),终因心脏病发作,第三部分未得完成。已完成部分由她的好友作家玛丽·麦卡锡于1978年整理出版。在这部著作中,阿伦特的思考仿佛又回到了哲学,重新审视"思想"的意义,但这回是放在人的思考机能能否增进他的"行动能力"方面;在何种意义上,思想能够增益人的明辨是非、分别美丑的能力?即阿伦特仍然是在她的"行动世界"的框架里进行她的哲学探索。
9、《康德哲学讲座》(Lectures On Kant's),这本薄薄的小册子是阿伦特在"新社会研究所"及芝加哥大学所作的关于康德哲学的讲座,其中所谈的就是在《心智人生》中未完成的"判断"部分,对于了解阿伦特最后的思想具有特殊的意义。阿伦特认为在政治判断中存在和美学判断相似的机能:"由特殊见普遍";与自身对话及在想象中与他人讨论的"反省判断";依据他人在场、以他人为导向的"共同知觉"(common sense)等。总之,判断的过程是与他人交流和沟通的过程;艾克曼这样的人是在失去了与他人任何直接和间接交流的能力,"无法从别人的立场来看问题",才变成了只会重复陈词滥调的"空洞"之人,因为缺乏独立判断的习惯而充当杀人机器的盲目执行者。
10、《拉赫尔·瓦伦哈根:一个犹太妇女的生活》,(Hahel Varnhagen:The life of a Jewess),这本书写于二十年代末到三十年代初,其中最后两个章节是在法莫道不消魂国流莫道不消魂亡期间写成的,德文版1958年,英文版直到1974年才出版。近年来这本书受到特别的关注,尤其是女性主义学者,将此当作一个女作家如何通过书写他人,而完成自我梳理、自我觉醒和最终找到自己的过程。拉赫尔是十九世纪初期德国著名的沙龙女主人,与歌德、史莱格尔兄弟、黑格尔都有过交往;但终免不了一生凄凉,临死前意识到这与自己犹太人出身有关;光是靠生活在浪漫的爱情和诗歌中无济于事。拉赫尔的沙龙故事和阿伦特早年的爱情故事有可类比之处。当阿伦特作为一个不满二十岁的女学生时,很快陷入了与老师海德格尔的恋情之中;四年后海德格尔把她送到雅斯贝尔斯那里完成博士学位,中止了这段恋情。孤独、悲苦的阿伦特在结婚之后仍很难完全从这桩感情中摆脱出来。在拉赫尔的沙龙故事和阿伦特的爱情故事之间存在着十分明确的重合之点:拉赫尔的沙龙将客观事实拒绝在外,推崇主观的、诗意的、孤独的美,并认为这些东西独立于世界之上;而阿伦特和她老师的关系也是不宜示人的,具有一种"无世界性"的秘密的特征。通过写作这本书,阿伦特获得了看待世界和他人的另外一种眼光和起点,即对客观世界有一种真正的兴趣和爱,而不是沉浸在主观领域。
阿伦特的其他重要出版物还有(身后出版):
1、《阿伦特和海德格尔书信集》
2、《阿伦特和雅斯贝尔斯书信集》
3、《阿伦特和布留歇尔书信集》(布留歇尔为阿伦特后来三十年岁月相濡以沫的丈夫)
4、《阿伦特和玛丽·麦卡锡书信集》
6、、《阿伦特和库尔德·布鲁门费尔德书信集》(库尔德是将犹太人的视角引进阿伦特的视野的人物;三十年代欧洲犹太组织领袖之一。)
7、《我愿意理解:有关我的生活和著作的回答》
8、《奥古斯丁爱的观念》(二十年代在雅斯贝尔斯那里完成的博士论文)
其余还有关于犹太复国主义问题的两三本文集《犹太复国主义的困境:随笔和评论》、《以色列和反犹主义》等,由他人编辑。
来源:思想评论
Nov 2007
张 淳 陶东风
2007-05-25 13:50:25
《极权主义的起源》,阿伦特著,林骧华译,台北时报出版公司,1995
汉娜·阿伦特和西蒙娜·波伏瓦、苏珊·桑塔格并称为西方当代最重要的女知识分子。最初使她获得世界性声誉的著作是《极权主义的起源》,因此,她也以政治哲学家的身份闻名于世。正如阿伦特在写给雅斯贝尔斯的信中所说,她是经由她本人的经历所获致的视角来阐释历史、理解其中所表达的东西,她的政治和哲学思想也就是她对自己的亲身经历和那个黑暗时代的反省和深思。
早期经历和犹太身份意识
1906年,汉娜·阿伦特(Hannah Arendt)出生在汉诺威,她的父母都来自东普鲁士哥尼斯堡的犹太中产阶半夜凉初透级家庭。她在父母的家乡度过了童年,接受了早期教育。一战期间,她就在那里度过了一段相对平静的生活,但失去了一直被病魔缠身的父亲。1924年秋,18岁的汉娜怀着对哲学和思想的向往来到活跃着那个时代最优秀思想家的马堡和弗莱堡求学,22岁时成为哲学博士。她的这段求学经历从根本上塑造了她一生的思想和道路,并结识了将影响她终生的哲学大师——马丁·海德格尔(Martin Heidegger)和卡尔·雅斯贝尔斯(Karl Jaspers)。其实,在阿伦特求学期间,弗莱堡的大学生完全不过问政治,尤其是学哲学的大学生,政治舞台被看成庸俗的。当时的阿伦特对政治也不感兴趣。但是,她这样的出身在这个时代注定要经历历史性的灾难和困惑,20世纪30年代纳粹掌权之后,随着局势的日益紧张,阿伦特也没有免于被关进集中营的命运。正是她亲身经历的20世纪的政治危机和种族迫东篱把酒黄昏后害使得她将毕生思考的重心转移到了政治领域。
幸好,阿伦特不像本雅明那样一辈子都有一个“驼背小人”跟在身后。相反,她似乎是一个很幸运的人,在真正的危险到来之前逃离欧洲,并获得一种世界性、历史性的视角来反观这个充满灾祸的世纪所发生的事件,从而反思整个西方现代性的困厄。[1]
虽然出身于一个同化的犹太中产阶半夜凉初透级家庭,但是在反犹情绪不断高涨的德国,阿伦特在哥尼斯堡时期就感受到了作为一个犹太人的不同和压抑。随着纳粹势力的日益增长,她开始严肃地思考这样一个问题,即对于她而言,做一名犹太人,特别是在德国,究竟意味着什么?写于1932年左右的《拉赫尔·法恩哈根:一个犹太女人的一生》(Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewish Woman)这本传记,揭示了她关于自己犹太身份的内心挣扎。在其中,她糅入了对于同时拥有一个德国身份和一个犹太身份的模棱特质的反思。雅斯贝尔斯曾建议她为自己对于身为德国人意味着什么的理解加上一个政治的和历史的宿命色彩,阿伦特的回答是深刻的:“任何形式的过度简化——无论它是犹太复国主义者的,还是同化主义者和反犹主义者的——都只能使得对真正处境的认识更加模糊。”她没有加入她所列举的这些团体中的任何一个。正如法恩哈根一样,她决定做一个被她称作“有意识的贱民”的人。她将不会被德国文化所同化,而是要有意识地恪守自己作为一个社会边缘人的身份。[2]阿伦特对极权主义的关注就是直接源于她身为德国犹太人的体验和思考,以及对她的民族的遭遇的关切。
极权主义的形而上学
阿伦特的政治哲学的独特之处就在于她从不建立任何体系,她的理论中的文学色彩和她对“讲故事”(storytelling)的强调越来越为研究者所重视。[3]熟悉阿伦特的著作的人都会注意到,她的注解中常常会出现文学家和他们的作品,如康拉德、陀思妥耶夫斯基、布莱希特、普鲁斯特,尤其是弗朗茨·卡夫卡,以至于西拉兹·多萨(Shiraz Dossa)曾经把阿伦特的作品称为“文学政治理论”。阿伦特非常推崇卡夫卡,利用一切机会关注他的文字。当时,卡夫卡在美国几乎默默无闻,而阿伦特在家里门厅的墙上就挂了一帧卡夫卡的大照片;在《过去与未来之间》这本书的前言里包含了一个很长的关于卡夫卡的寓言的讨论,而阿伦特在写作和思考极权主义的同时,也正沉浸在卡夫卡的小说中。1940年代晚期,她作为舍肯出版社(Schocken Books)的高级编辑在美国翻译、出版了卡夫卡的日记。与此同时,阿伦特正在用英文写作关于极权主义的文稿,这就是《极权主义的起源》(原名《我们这个时代的重负》,德文名字是《极权统治的要素和起源》)。可以说,卡夫卡和他的作品在多方面启发了阿伦特关于极权主义统治的思考和理解。
1.塞壬的歌声[4]:必然性法则的诱惑
直到1943年初,美国人才知道纳粹对犹太人的大规模的系统灭绝,这个消息对于阿伦特来说无疑是一个巨大的震撼。多年以后阿伦特在接受高斯的访谈时这样回忆道:“这犹如地狱之门打开了。人们有一种观念,无论发生什么事情都有可能弥补……这件事不能。这是不允许发生的事情……已经发生的事情是超越我们所有人的经验的。”[5]阿伦特认为这不仅仅是德国的罪行,而且是人类的罪行。她开始深入研究国家社会主义,认为纳粹的种族灭绝机构在历史上是没有先例的,然而究竟是什么样的传统丧失了使得这样的事情成为可能?是什么样的历史暗流的汇聚才会导致这种结果?是什么样的意识形态使得人们在纳粹统治时期心甘情愿地充当杀人机器?她试图寻找这些问题的答案。
阿伦特所生活的20世纪是一个失去家园、希望和恐惧并存的时代。在尼采等存在主义哲学家之后的现代世界中,普遍传统的权威(尤其是宗教)已经被打破,旧的秩序已然消亡,而新的秩序尚未确定。从现在开始,人类要自己决定他们的未来,这是一种不堪承受的“自由”的重担。阿伦特认为,比起承担自由行动所必然伴随的不可预测的结果,人们宁愿使自己屈服于一种确定的、然而是虚假的“神圣”法则,一种全盘性解决问题的“总体方案”。这正是人们拥抱极权主义的形而上的原因。在纳粹主义这里,这个法则是声称特定种族比其他种族优越的“自然法则”;在苏维埃极权主义这里,这个法则就是声称特定阶半夜凉初透级必然灭亡的“历史法则”。[6]
阿伦特在卡夫卡的小说中发现了这种形而上的元素,即现代社会对于超越人类的自然或历史法则的信仰,认为每个人必须服从这个法则。他的小说也深刻地描述了这种信仰内在所具有的可怕的可能性。随着这种信仰的形成,现代人放弃了阿伦特所特别关注的人类所独具的(区别于动物的)创新的能力,也就放弃了人类的境况。她没有像卡夫卡那样以文学作品的形式讲述某一个“K”面对着万能的、无法接近的法律,或者面对一个如同上帝一般决定着是非曲直的城堡主人的故事,她的天赋才能是历史探究和哲学思考。她梳理着历史,为的是寻找到那个最终导致了一个纳粹极权国家的根源。
在《极权主义的起源》中,阿伦特先后梳理了反犹主义、帝国主义和极权主义这三种力量。在极权主义这部分中,她对纳粹和斯大林的两类极权统治进行了直接分析,其基本要素在《弗朗茨·卡夫卡:一次重新评价》这篇更早的文章中就已经形成了。在这里,阿伦特认为卡夫卡描写了一个把自身作为上帝的替代品而建立的社会,这里的人们把社会的法律看作神圣法则———无法根据人的意志而改变。这个世界的错误就在于它的神化,它的代表一种神圣必然性的伪装。卡夫卡想要通过描写其隐藏结构的丑恶,通过真实和伪装的对比来摧毁这个世界。
阿伦特从对卡夫卡的小说《审判》的分析入手,认为它揭示了“人类必须服从于一种必然的、自动的过程”这种信仰的危险。正如监狱牧师所告诉K的那样:“不必把任何事情都当真,必须把它当作必然。”也正像K所理解的那样,“它将谎言变成普遍原则”。她写道:“《审判》中的K所陷进的这种机器的权力,一方面依赖于必然性的出现,另一方面依赖于人们对必然性的赞同。在《审判》的背景里,必然性变得比真理还要重要。”一个不服从于这种必然性的人,就被看作一个抵抗某种神圣秩序的罪人。抓住了K的这种罪恶感开始改变并且型塑它的受害人,直到他适合于受审。“就是这种感觉使他能够进入必然性、不公正和说谎的世界,根据规则扮演一个角色,并使自己适应现存状况。”[7]最后,约瑟夫·K自愿将残忍的死刑作为法律的一部分而接受。阿伦特认为这是我们这个世纪的特点,它在一种必然性的名义下实施最残酷的暴行。对那些放弃他们的自由和行动的权利,为了幻想付出生命的代价的人们来说,没有比卡夫卡在《审判》中所总结的话更加仁慈的了:“似乎他的耻辱将留存于人间。”
但是,卡夫卡的小说还提供了另一种人的可能性。阿伦特将《审判》中的约瑟夫·K与《城堡》中的K进行比较,她认为后者的意义正在于他没有屈从于必然性的规定,而是一个英勇的“好心(good will)的人”。K作为一个异乡人出于他自己的自由意愿来到城堡属下的村庄,为了找到一个属于公共世界中的正当位置而斗争。对于村民们视为圣旨的城堡官僚机构的命令,K拒绝服从,因为这是“来自上面”的专断的指令,是侵占他的自由的蛮横企图。他与其他村民的格格不入不仅是因为他不“属于村庄,也不属于城堡”的异乡人身份,而且因为在这个世界里,他是惟一正常和健康的人。这个世界的所有人性当中正常的爱情、工作和友谊都被夺走,变成一种从上面恩赐的礼物。这种恩赐是神秘的,对于它人可以接受或拒绝,但从来不能够创造。因此,对于村民来说,K的奇怪正在于他对这些本来是被恩赐的东西的追求。虽然他最终精疲力竭地死去了,但是就像阿伦特指出的,他使一些村民看到“人的权利是值得为之奋斗的,城堡的规则不是神圣法则,因此也是可以被攻破的”。村民们醒悟到“那些遭受了我们这种体验,被我们这种害怕所困扰……为每一声敲门声而战栗的人们,都不能够直视事情”。并且,“由于你的到来我们是多么幸运啊!”这个异乡人的奋斗,除了成为一个榜样以外没有其他的结果,然而“因为他不像《审判》中的K,没有服从于显现为必然性的东西,他没有留下任何耻辱”。
因此,服从于虚假的必然性对失落了传统根基的现代人来说,就像塞壬的歌声对航海人那样,有着极大的诱惑力。在阿伦特看来,这种诱惑正是“极权主义的形而上的元素”。尽管无法被经验地证实,但在某种程度上正是文学作品的想像维度给她带来的启发。并且,阿伦特认为,虽然纳粹党人和斯大林的政体已经成为过去,但是这种诱惑的危险元素还和我们在一起。因为这不是一个德国或俄半夜凉初透国所特有的特点,而是现代性本身永远的潜在可能性,是我们这个时代的危机。而卡夫卡的意义正是在于,“他拒绝屈服于任何偶然事件……他想要建造一个与人类的需要和尊严相一致的世界,一个人类的行动由他自己决定,一个由他自己的法律而不是由来自上面或下面的神秘权力所统治的世界。此外,他最强烈的愿望就是成为这样的世界的一个部分——他不关心成为一个天才或任何一种伟大的化身”。[8]
2.群氓的社会———孤独和多余
阿伦特在《意识形态与恐怖:一种统治的新形式》中还分析了极权主义政权所开发的现代性中另一个形而上的元素———孤独。“极权统治……它的自身的基础是孤独,是根本不属于这个世界的经验,这是人类经验中最彻底、最绝望的一种。”阿伦特认为,19世纪阶半夜凉初透级社会解体之后,没有出现任何能够将人们基于共同的利益而聚集到一起的社会结构,其结果就是群氓心理的出现。这种群氓由“无根的”和“多余的”个体所组成,那种孤独的体验就是现代体验的一个基本组成部分。她说,孤独是“我们这个时代的疾病”。而这个疾病正是几乎所有卡夫卡的小说所重点表现的精神状态,他对“孤独”进行着艺术的探索。卡夫卡的挚友马克斯·布洛德曾经将《审判》、《城堡》、《美国》称为“孤独三部曲”。
阿伦特意义上的“孤独”还与无根和成为多余的情境紧密相关,“无根意味着在这个世界上没有立足之地,不受别人的承认和保障;成为多余者意味着根本不属于这个世界”。[9]《城堡》中的K就是一个孤独地在这个世界里寻找自己的正当位置的异乡人,他为自己设定的目标不过是成家立业、成为一个共同世界的有用公民,这仅仅是一个人不可剥夺的权利。但是在一个卡夫卡式的世界里,这样的权利没有许诺给任何人,它只是被随意恩赐的礼物宿命般地降临到某人头上。K最终作为一个异乡人孤独地、无根地、多余地死去。阿伦特说,卡夫卡的世界不仅仅是一个噩梦,对40年代的人来说,它成了我们自己的世界,K的命运已经变成我们自己的命运:“一直在增长的政治的和自然的无家可归,以及精神上的和社会性的无根性……是我们这个时代的大家都参与的一个巨大的大众命运,尽管在强度和痛苦的程度上非常不同。”[10]
对阿伦特来说,孤独和多余都是大众社会的到来而导致的群氓的症状,而它在集中营达到它最可怕的结果———非人化,而孤独与非人化的关系正是《变形记》的一个关键主题。在格里高尔之死中,卡夫卡似乎对“害虫”就可以被残酷地消灭这个试验有所预知。格里高尔家庭对他的抛弃和灭绝恰好对应于阿伦特关于集中营里发生的故事的分析。
极权主义的统治技术
1.神秘的权力——官僚机构
阿伦特认为20世纪早期的官僚机构是极权主义形成的必要元素之一。
在她论卡夫卡的《审判》时,阿伦特写道:“卡夫卡充分展现了所谓官僚机构的真实本质的可怕——用管理取代统治,用独半夜凉初透裁政令取代法律。”因为“他知道当一个人陷进官僚机构的话就已经被判刑了;当法律的解释与非法的管理相伴随,当法律阐释者慢性的无行动由官僚机构所补偿,而这种机构无意义的自动运行拥有最终决定的特权时,没有人可以从司佳节又重阳法程序中期许正义”。[11]
所谓官僚主义,“从法学的角度来说,是一种与法的支配相反的、通过政令进行支配的体制”。而且,“政令通常是保密的,在具体事件上需要正当的理由”。其结果就是,“那些生活在行政命令支配下的人们,全然不知道统治他们的到底是一些什么人”。[12]从而,虚假的神秘主义是官僚体制成为一种统治形式的标记,它所统治的人们从来不会真正知道为什么发生一些事情。城堡下的居民在城堡官半夜凉初透员的神秘而可怕的权力面前变得麻痹,变得服从于有着无穷可能性的解释,在这种无尽解释的思索的框架中,整个生命和世界的肌理都被假设为神秘的深不可测的东西。约瑟夫·K试图通过各种途径弄清“法律”的源头,但每次都无功而返。就像阿伦特在《极权主义的起源》中指出的,在极权主义国家,权限之所在极不明确。“某个机关被公众知道得越多,它所拥有的权力就越小”[13],“权力通常开始于不曾拥有公开性的地方”。[14]
2.非人化和全面控制的实现——集中营
尽管如此,官僚体制与极权主义两者仍然存在着重大的差异。正如阿伦特所说:“官僚制支配仅仅满足于在政治领域内支配其所属的臣民的外在命运,却忽略了掌握他们的精神生活;然而,极权主义支配则更彻底地把握了绝对权力的本质,并善于运用手段,对于公民的一切方面,无论是私人的还是公共的,无论是精神的还是外在的,一律都加以一贯的、残酷的控制。其结果,如果说,旧式官僚制支配扼杀了众多民族在政治上的自发性和创造性,那么,与之相比,极权主义支配则窒息了人的行动在一切领域里的自发性和创造性。政治上的创造性一旦失去,随之而来就会在所有方面无所作为。”[15]在《极权主义的起源》的结尾,阿伦特对死亡集中营进行了分析。
她说集中营的目标就是“把所有具有无限复数性和多样性的人组织起来,使他们变得好像一个人”。[16]也就是说,集中营湮没了人类的个性和差异,取消了行动的不确定性,以便全面预测和控制人们的行动。因此,“人类的本质在这里岌岌可危”。按照阿伦特的定义,这种人类的本质即我们自发地、创新地、自由地行动的能力。[17]集中营“消灭人类行为的自发性表现,将人类个性转变为一种纯粹的事物,转变成连动物都不如的东西”。在集中营里,极权主义的“改变人类本质”的企图才能完满实现,她认为“极权主义的基本信念———一切事物都是可能的———在此经受验证”。[18]
阿伦特认为,卡夫卡在他的小说中描述了一个与这种过程相似的世界。首先,他的主人公甚至没有一个活生生的名字,他们缺少所有组成一个真实个体的众多细节特征。其次,在他们生活的社会里,每个人都被分配了一个固定的角色,大家都为了某种超人类的尽善尽美而努力奋斗,“在与工作的完全同一中生活”。他们没有心理品质,因为他们除了固定职业者什么也不是。比如在《美国》这部小说中,当宾馆守门人的头头弄错了一个人的身份时,他说:“如果我把一个人错认为另一个人,我还怎么能继续在这里当守门人啊……”犯错就等于丢掉工作,因此,他甚至不能承认犯错的可能性。“由于社会强迫他们否认人类犯错的可能性,固定职业者们也就不能保留人性,而必须像超人那样行动。卡夫卡世界中的所有雇员、官半夜凉初透员都远远不是完美的,但是他们在一个全权的统一设想中行动。”[19]城堡没有给辖下的居民留下任何行动、自发性、个性,甚至思想的空间。因此,它的统治否定了使得我们人类显得独一无二的所有品质。
阿伦特还提出了集中营通过“三步杀人”系统地达到对个性的破坏。“第一个必要的步骤是取消人的法律性格。”[20]因为,集中营置于一般法律系统之外(在通常的法律中,特定的罪行要蒙受特定的可以预测的惩罚)。《审判》和《城堡》也清楚地展现了对“法律之人”的消灭。当约瑟夫·K在《审判》的一开头被捕时,他抗东篱把酒黄昏后议道:“这些人是谁?他们在说什么?他们代表什么官方机构?K生活在一个守法的国家里,这里有着普遍的和平,所有法律都是有效的;谁敢在他自己的卧室里 ** 他?”然而,他很快开始发现自己完全“在通常的刑事系统之外”。[21]并且,约瑟夫·K的被捕、审判乃至处决与他曾经干了什么毫无关系,他是被独断地 ** 和处决的。(“因为他没有犯任何错就在一天早上被 ** 了。”)这正与集中营中的受害者相似,他们绝大部分“人们都没有干任何与他们的被捕有合理联系的事”。阿伦特认为这种独断的裁决显示了集中营的基本原则,“一个独断的系统的目标是摧毁整个人民的公民权利”。
因此,集中营里的受害者是无辜的,“他们缺乏一个可区别的罪行的状况,他们彻底面对着被任意处置的可能性”。《城堡》中巴纳巴斯家庭的灾难也映证了这一点。当巴纳巴斯的女儿拒绝了一个城堡高级官吏的求爱之后,这个家庭就开始被所有其他村民回避,完全陷入了孤立和恐惧的生活状态。巴纳巴斯先生长久地等在城堡的山下,以谋求官方赦免他们的“罪行”,然而,城堡官半夜凉初透员告诉他没有任何罪行记录在案。此时,他被抛入了绝望之中,因为他知道“在他能够被原谅之前,他必须证明他的罪行,但它被所有部门否认了”。他无法证明自己的罪行,也就无法获得某种特定的“可计量的惩罚”,从而完全暴露在专断面前,面对着彻底的无止尽的惩罚。
在消灭“人的法律性格”之后,阿伦特写道:“在制造活死人的过程中,下一步关键是摧毁人身上的道德人格(moral person in man)。这主要靠在历史上第一次使殉难成为不可能的事。”[22]在集中营里,死亡被匿名地实施;受害者不是像敌人那样被杀死,而是像动物(害虫)那样被集体消灭,并且被归入彻底的湮没中,从而使得殉难成为不可能。“摧毁了道德人格,取消了法律人格,毁灭个体性就几乎永远是成功的。”[23]大多数集中营居民之所以“允许自己毫无抵抗地排队走进毒气室”,正是因为他们的个体性意识被摧毁了,他们失去了自发地行动或抵抗强加给他们可怕命运的能力。《变形记》中也上演着一幕毫无抵抗地接受自己的毁灭,被一家人彻底遗忘的故事。格里高尔变成大虫子之后,被置于一个完全孤独和无世界性的超自然的环境中。随着公共世界越来越远,格里高尔的人性也越来越消失了。就像集中营的受害者一样,他最终放弃了反抗自己被灭迹的命运:“一个完全非人化的格里高尔开始接受他的命运:‘他必须消失的决定在他的脑海里比他妹妹更加坚定,如果那是可能的话……他的头嵌入地板,从他的鼻孔冒出了最后的呼吸。’”他的死亡甚至没有被家人记住,因此,格里高尔的彻底的死亡悲哀地证实了阿伦特的观点:“在某种意义上”,集中营“夺走了个人自己的死亡,证明从此以后一切都不属于他,他也不属于任何人。他的死亡只对一种事实——他从来未曾真正存在过——打上了封印”。[24]
阿伦特认为卡夫卡的特别之处在于,他的故事写的不是一个个真实的事件,而是组成佳节又重阳人类失败的各个元素,是事件本身的原型。同样,阿伦特自己对极权主义的分析也是试图找出这个真实存在过的政权的基本元素,然而她发现这些元素正是现代性本身的组成部分。但这并不是说现代性不可避免地要导致极权主义,这些元素自身没有一个是极权主义的,只有当它们以一种特殊的方式结合才会结晶成为极权主义的统治。阿伦特认为,极权主义的综合会在一个长时期内保留一种现代的诱惑,极权主义已成为这个世纪的诅咒。
《极权主义的起源》这本皇皇巨著于1951年出版,引起了广泛的好评,阿伦特甚至成了一本详细讨论她的著作的杂志的“封面女郎”。同年,阿伦特成为美国公民,经过了十七年流莫道不消魂亡逃难的生活,如今她终于摆脱了无国籍的身份。这种生活也最终为她提供了选择做一个自觉的“有政治意识的贱民”的基础和条件,使得她进一步深思和理解现代性的基本问题,从而在今后的思考中求索一种我们能够共同铸造非极权的解决方式。
参考文献:
[1]有关阿伦特的生平参见阿洛伊斯·普林茨,《爱这个世界———汉娜·阿伦特传》,社会科学文献出版社,2001;帕特里夏·奥坦伯德·约翰逊,《阿伦特》,中华书局,2006。
[2]阿伦特在一个“有社会抱负的新贵”(socially ambitious parvenu)和一个“有政治意识的贱民”(politically conscious pariah)之间作了严格的区分。她意识到,她所面临的选择只有或者被德国文化所同化,或者做一个社会的局外人。她认定,前一种选择对于犹太人来说只是一个幻想,重要的是有意识地做一个局外人。
[3]Lisa Jane Disch, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy, Cornell University Press, 这本著作专门探讨了作为一种批判理论的形式的“讲故事”对于哲学限制的超越。
[4]参见卡夫卡的短篇小说《塞壬的歌声》。
[5]阿洛伊斯·普林茨,《爱这个世界——汉娜·阿伦特传》,社会科学文献出版社,2001:100。
[6]阿伦特在《极权主义的起源》里分析了极权统治的元素,她把它们分成两种。一种可以由社会学家证明,例如,她认为19世纪阶半夜凉初透级社会的解体以及作为其结果的“大众社会”的出现为极权主义铺好了道路;另一种元素则更加形而上一些,并且很难被经验地证实,比如阿伦特在卡夫卡的小说中所发现的极权主义的形而上的元素。
[7][8][10][11]Franz Kafka: A Revaluation (on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of his death);文章收录于Essays in Understanding 1930-1954, Hannah Arendt, Edited by Jerome Kohn, Harcourt & Company, New York.
[9][12][13][14][15][16][18][20][22][23][24]阿伦特,《极权主义的起源》,林骧华译,台北时报出版公司,1995:653,653,587,594,373,644,586,597,600,603,601。
[17]阿伦特认为,我们的“必然诞生”——出生所内含的新的开始——使得以无法预测的方式行动成为可能。人类所独有的自发行动的潜力可以更新人类世界,促使极权主义走向毁灭。一个极权主义的政体期待它的人民无思考地使自己臣服于超越人类的力量。极权主义无法忍受不可预测的行动,它的目的是建造这样一个世界,在这里,每个人都公平地“多余”,这样的任何一个人类“齿轮”都可以被另一个所取代。
[19]《重估卡夫卡》。
[21]弗朗茨·卡夫卡,《审判》。
(作者单位:首都师范大学文学院)
Nov 2007
拉塞尔·雅格比 著 吴万伟 译
一条街道以她的名字命名,接连不断的学术会议来纪念她,称赞她的新书一本本出现。100年前的10月出生的汉娜·阿伦特(Hannah Arendt)俨然添列哲学英雄的小世界。这种声誉只是在她1975年去世后才来到她身边。生前她获得了普林斯顿大学,斯密斯(Smith)等大学的荣誉博士学位,丹麦授予她松宁奖(Sonning Prize)因为“欧洲文化做出的有益贡献”。这个奖也被授予了阿尔伯特·史怀哲(Albert Schweitzer)和丘吉尔(Winston Churchill)。当她发表公开演讲的时候,学生们把过道和走廊都挤得满满的。
阿伦特满足了哲学英雄的所有条件。她是德国犹太人难民,古典教育修养和现代世俗智慧都非常丰富。经常提到希腊和拉丁术语,她的著作散发出深刻的思想。她不害怕提及讨论大话题---正义,邪有暗香盈袖恶,专人比黄花瘦制主义,后者干预当今的政治议题比如越南战争,民权运动,以及对阿道夫·艾希曼(Adolf Eichmann)的审判。她不仅从事形而上学思考,而且讲究现实,不仅思想深刻,而且性感迷人。纽约批评家艾尔弗雷德·卡津(Alfred Kazin)回忆她是个非常有魅力和轻快活泼,甚至是个荡东篱把酒黄昏后妇(femme fatale)。
不过她这个明星如此灿烂,主要是因为美国的知识分子苍穹太暗淡了。毕竟,除了她,政治哲学家还有谁?在哪里?前一个伟大的美国政治哲学家约翰·杜威(John Dewey)1952年去世。从那以后,美国哲学除了理查德·罗蒂(Richard Rorty)这个例外,已经消失在技术问题上,在政治哲学的范畴内,最大的人物之一约翰·罗尔斯(John Rawls)仍然是抽象的和与世隔绝的。他的著作或许加快学院派哲学家衰弱的脉搏,但是它不能推动我们剩下的人。
属于阿伦特一代的欧洲人思想家缺少她的魅力。举两个明显的竞争者:萨特(Jean-Paul Sartre)由于终生的极端主义和反复无常的政治,现在引起的热情逐渐减弱。另一个以赛亚·柏林(Isaiah Berlin)因为他的极端谨慎和坚定的温和态度很少能激起人们的激情。和阿伦特不一样,柏林避免政治倾向和大问题的著作。(实际上,他从来没有真正写一本书)尽管阿伦特写了比如《人的条件》(The Human Condition)多卷本著作,副标题是“现代人面临的中心困境研究”(A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man),柏林则写诸如“两种自由概念”(Two Concepts of Liberty)和“18世纪欧洲思想的所谓相对主义”(Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought)之类的文章。阿伦特选择立场,柏林推诿躲闪。
不仅因为多数人的暗淡让阿伦特闪耀更强烈的光芒。她的著作尤其是她的文章往往能够激起热烈反响。但是除了《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》(Eichmann in Jerusalem)外,她的主要著作都遭受阴云。讽刺意味的是,阿伦特越是想哲学味更浓些,她的话就越模糊不清。即使在最认真地阅读后,仍然很难明白她到底要说什么。不管是《人的条件》还是让她成名的处半夜凉初透女作《极权主义的起源》(The Origins of Totalitarianism)都是如此。但是她得益于普遍的观念,即哲学著作的晦涩难懂正好表明哲学思想的深刻。
她的信徒有时候承认《极权主义的起源》组织混乱,非常不成功。她试图要表现纳粹和斯大林主义作为专人比黄花瘦制主义的双胞胎,但是直到结论部分才提到斯大林主义。关于帝国主义和种族主义的章节,结构连贯,观点独到,但是和斯大林的专人比黄花瘦制主义没有关系,因为斯大林思想既不是来自帝国主义也不是来自种族主义。为了说明她的观点,她把纳粹和斯大林主义,意识形态和哲学的喃喃自语结合起来。在某种程度上,群众的“孤独”激发了专人比黄花瘦制主义。“虽然群众沉溺于逃避现实的愿望,因为在他们的基本上无家可归的情况下他们不再能忍受偶然的,不可理解的方面,同样真实的是他们对小说的渴望与人类思想的那些能力有关,人类思维的结构上的一致性优越于思维的表现。
阿伦特晦涩难懂是有原因的。她是德国存在主义者马丁·海德格尔(Martin Heidegger)的学生和情人,正如一个批评家说的俏皮话,把死亡事实本身变成了哲学家的专业秘密。虽然她和海德格尔的通信引起很多高层次的流言蜚语,在当今的大学,海德格尔博士与漂亮的18岁学生的绯闻比他同情纳粹更加无耻、让人讨厌。她的思想忠诚更是问题。她从来没有从概念上与海德格尔决裂,甚至打算将《人的条件》献给他。她在写给海德格尔的信中解释说为什么不这样做是因为“我们之间的关系”还没有厘清。但是,她想让海德格尔明白,该书“几乎在任何方面都归功于你的指导。”
实际上,半宗教色彩的海德格尔式的术语,焦虑,孤独,流落异乡的痛苦等说明了她的著作。支持希特勒(或者斯大林)的民众没有遭受失业或者饥饿的痛苦,而是承受“孤独”。专人比黄花瘦制主义“建立在孤独的基础上,在不属于世界的认识上,这种意识是最极端最绝望的人的经历。”
当然,她最著名和最受争议的著作《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》是完全不同的风格,非常明白易懂,劲头十足的。值得注意的是,她的所有著作中只有这本《艾希曼》是应《纽约客》(The New Yorker)之约撰写的,1963年在该杂志上发表,以一系列单独的文章在总的标题“自由记者”或是写给《纽约客》的以无情的删减修改而闻名的传奇编辑威廉·夏恩(William Shawn),---造成阿伦特搁置她哲学上的浮夸的言语。
但是《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》引人注目的一点是提出的术语“平庸的恶”(the banality of evil)在某种程度上是阿伦特自从她的《起源》以来完全改变了思想。在那本书里,她的结论是专人比黄花瘦制主义用全新的东西展现给世界。专人比黄花瘦制主义企图“改变人性本身”。那是“极端的恶”(radical evil)是“我们全部哲学传统”以外的现象。我们实际上没有任何东西可以依靠为了理解这个破坏了我们所知道的任何标准的现象。”
但是,10年后她发现艾希曼在以色列受审,她得出了相反的结论。人性没有被改变,专人比黄花瘦制主义罪恶不是极端的,而且是完全缺乏想象力平淡无奇的。她写到“人们不能从艾希曼那里获得任何恶魔般的,凶残的深度。”正如常常尖刻的哲学家和批评家艾尼斯特·葛尔纳(Ernest Gellner)说的“在她描述了专人比黄花瘦制主义一半是卡夫卡的审判(Kafka's Trial)一半是瓦格纳(Wagner)之后,艾希曼的平庸肯定让她感到困惑不解,遭到打击。”
所以,阿伦特的最著名的两本书是相互矛盾的,因为她从来就没有调和两者。她的信徒小心翼翼地围绕这个矛盾或者学究式地试图协调极端和平庸的罪恶。其他人不那么顺从。犹太神秘主义学者哥舒姆·舒勒姆(Gershom Scholem)在写给她的信中抗东篱把酒黄昏后议她的关于专人比黄花瘦制主义的书提供了与她的艾希曼报告“矛盾”的观点。“那时候,你还没有做出发现,显然,罪恶是平庸的”。阿伦特承认“你说得很对。我改变了观点,不再说极端的罪恶了”她的诚实让人感动,但是毁掉了她的《起源》研究。这意味着她最重要的书《艾希曼》在她的著作处于独特的位置。它不仅是她最没有哲学味道的书,而且其中关于罪恶的观点破坏了她从前著作中的理论。
她的支持者缺乏她那样的远见试图修补这个裂缝。“反对舒勒姆的观点认为极端罪恶和平庸罪恶是矛盾的,我想说对罪恶的这些概念之间的可以调和性。”哲学家理查德·伯恩斯坦(Richard J. Bernstein)说。别忘了,他的对象,阿伦特已经同意舒勒姆的观点了。另外一个学者认为阿伦特自己误解了她的著作和康德的观点。“极端的恶”(radical evil)这个概念最初来自康德。第三个人用“极端恶的平庸性”(the banality of radical evil)来解决这个矛盾。这个专家采用阿伦特式术语告诉我们“阿伦特认为极端罪恶的平庸性在于否认我们的虚无,我们的孤寂和存在的不可能性。”
阿伦特的成就最终落在《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》上以及一些思想深刻的文章和包含哲理的传略。偶尔她让人惋惜地错过目标,比如在她回顾阿肯色州小石城,在那里她看到了暴徒规则(mob rule)(对隐私权的侵犯)在艾森豪威尔总统使用联邦军队强迫学校合并。另一方面,她关于犹太复国主义(Zionism)和以色列的文章也值得反复阅读。她是犹太复国莫道不消魂军国主义(Zionist militarism)的激烈批评者。她在1948年警告不妥协的犹太复国主义可能赢得下一场战争,但是质疑这样会导致什么样的结果。胜利的犹太人将生活在完全敌对的阿拉伯世界的大环境中,被围困在受到更大威胁的边界内,沉溺于身体上的自我保护。”她在《“犹祸”——现代的犹太认同和政治》(The Jew as Pariah)写到。这些观察是她最突出的观点。这些比多卷本的著作更能体现阿伦特的学术水平,在她的最著名的支持者和传记作者最近的著作中,这些文章都没有引起注意。伊丽莎白·扬-布鲁艾尔(Elisabeth Young-Bruehl)的著作《为什么阿伦特很重要》(Why Arendt Matters)本来试图要显示她对当代政治重要性的,可是里面根本没有提到阿伦特关于以色列和犹太复国主义的文章,更不要说进行讨论了。
阿伦特曾经把自己定位为自由撰稿人,被人称为哲学家她有时候还表示反对。实际上,她最好住在纽约知识分子圈子之外,属于20世纪中期那些难以归类的作家和批评家之列。阿伦特是菲利普·拉甫(Philip Rahv)埃德蒙德·威尔逊(Edmund Wilson)长期伙伴的小说家及评论家玛丽·麦卡锡(Mary McCarthy)的朋友,经常为《评论》(Commentary)《党派评论》(Partisan Review)《纽约书评》和《持莫道不消魂不同有暗香盈袖政见者》(Dissent)当然还包括纽约实质分子的刊物《纽约客》投稿。阿伦特最好的著作是她的文章和《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》,这些著作中的雄辩力量和勇气胆识足以说明阿伦特的地位。这些都是她哲学味道最少的著作。
除了这些著作外,她的杰作包括存在主义术语体现出来的模糊巨著。她被看作狮子是因为现在所有的狮子都被关进笼子里,被阉割了。以赛亚·柏林曾经评论说他太谨慎了不敢发表自己的思想,阿伦特是本世纪被过高评价的哲学家。柏林应该知道,即使他分享了这个荣誉,他也是半个右莫道不消魂派。
作者简介:拉塞尔·雅格比(Russell Jacoby)加州大学洛杉矶分校历史系教授。最新著作是《不完美的图画:反乌托邦时代的乌托邦思想》(Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age (哥伦比亚大学出版社2005)
译自:Hannah Arendt's Fame Rests on the Wrong Foundation
http://chronicle.com/temp/reprint.php?id=504l1wrkld6n653c3vcmh0grscqpvnc1
Sep 2007
Library of Congress, US
When Hannah Arendt published The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1951, World War II had ended and Hitler was dead, but Stalin lived and ruled. Arendt wanted to give her readers a sense of the phenomenal reality of totalitarianism, of its appearance in the world as a terrifying and completely new form of government. In the first two parts of the book she excavated hidden elements in modern anti-Semitism and European imperialism that coalesced in totalitarian movements; in the third part she explored the organization of those movements, dissected the structure of Nazism and Stalinist Bolshevism in power, and scrutinized the "double claim" of those regimes "to total domination and global rule." Her focus, to be sure, is mainly on Nazism, not only because more information concerning it was available at the time, but also because Arendt was more familiar with Germany and hence with the origins of totalitarianism there than in Russia. She knew, of course, that those origins differed substantially in the two countries and later, in different writings, would undertake to right the imbalance in her earlier discussion.
The enormous complexity of The Origins of Totalitarianism arises from its interweaving of an understanding of the concept of totalitarianism with the description of its emergence and embodiment in Nazism and Stalinism. The scope of Arendt's conceptual objectives may be glimpsed in the plan she drew up for six lectures on the nature of totalitarianism delivered at the New School for Social Research in March and April of 1953. The first lecture dealt with totalitarianism's "explosion" of our traditional "categories of thought and standards of judgment," thus at the outset stating the difficulty of understanding totalitarianism at all. In the second lecture she considered the different kinds of government as they were first formulated by Plato and then jumped many centuries to Montesquieu's crucial discovery of each kind of government's principle of action and the human experience in which that principle is embedded. In the third lecture she explicated three important distinctions: first, between governments of law and arbitrary power; secondly, between the traditional notion of humanly established laws and the new totalitarian concept of laws that govern the evolution of nature and direct the movement of history; and, thirdly, between "traditional sources of authority" that stabilize "legal institutions," thereby accommodating human action, and totalitarian laws of motion whose function is, on the contrary, to stabilize human beings so that the predetermined courses of nature and history can run freely through them. The fourth lecture addressed the totalitarian "transformation" of an ideological system of belief into a deductive principle of action. In the fifth lecture the basic experience of human loneliness in totalitarianism was contrasted with that of impotence in tyranny and differentiated from the experiences of isolation and solitude, which are essential to the activities of making and thinking but "marginal phenomena in political life." In the final lecture Arendt distinguished "the political reality of freedom" from both its "philosophical idea" and the "inherent 'materialism'" of Western political thought.
In addition to its complexity the stylistic richness of The Origins of Totalitarianism lies in its admixture of erudition and imagination, which is nowhere more manifest than in the particular examples by which Arendt brought to light the elements of totalitarianism. These examples include her devastating portrait of Disraeli and her tragic account of the "great" and "bitter" life of T. E. Lawrence; other exemplary figures are drawn from works of literature by authors such as Kipling and Conrad (see The Origins of Totalitarianism, chapter 7). A single, striking instance of the latter is Conrad's Heart of Darkness, which Arendt called "the most illuminating work on actual race experience in Africa," her emphasis clearly falling on the word "experience." Engaged in "the merry dance of death and trade," Conrad's imperialistic adventurers were in quest of ivory and entertained few scruples over slaughtering the indigenous inhabitants of "the phantom world of the dark continent" in order to obtain it. The subject of Conrad's work, in which the story told by the always ambiguous Marlow is recounted by an unnamed narrator, is the encounter of Africans with "superfluous" Europeans "spat out" of their societies. As the author of the whole tale as well as the tale within the tale, Conrad was intent not "to hint however subtly or tentatively at an alternative frame of reference by which we may judge the actions and opinions of his characters."1 Marlow, a character twice removed from the reader, is aware that the "conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing." It is in the person of the "remarkable" and "eloquent" Mr. Kurtz that Marlow seeks the "idea" that alone can offer redemption: "An idea at the back of [the conquest], not a sentimental pretense but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea."
As Marlow's steamer penetrates "deeper and deeper into the heart of darkness" in search of Kurtz's remote trading station, Africa becomes increasingly "impenetrable to human thought." In a passage cited by Arendt, Marlow observes the Africans on the shore:
The prehistoric man was cursing us, praying to us, welcoming us--who could tell? We . . . glided past like phantoms, wondering and secretly appalled, as sane men would be, before an enthusiastic outbreak in a madhouse. We could not understand because we were too far and could not remember, because we were traveling in the night of the first ages, of those ages that are gone leaving hardly a sign--and no memories. . . . The earth seemed unearthly . . . and the men were . . . No, they were not inhuman. Well, you know, that was the worst of it--this suspicion of their not being inhuman. It would come slowly to one. They howled and leapt and spun and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity--like yours--the thought of your remote kinship with this wild and passionate uproar.
The next sentence spoken by Marlow consists of one word, "Ugly," and that word leads directly to his discovery of Kurtz, the object of his fascination. He reads a report that Kurtz, who exemplifies the European imperialist ("All Europe contributed to [his] making"), has written to the "International Society for the Suppression of Savage Customs." It is a report in the name of progress, of "good practically unbounded," and it gives Marlow a sense "of an exotic Immensity ruled by an August Benevolence." But at the bottom of the report's last page, "luminous and terrifying like a flash of lightning in a serene sky," Kurtz has scrawled "Exterminate all the brutes!" Thus racism is revealed as the "idea" of the mad Kurtz and the darkness of his heart becomes the counterpart of the not inhuman but "uncivilized" darkness of Africa. The horrific details follow, the decapitated heads of Africans stuck on poles, facing inward toward Kurtz's dwelling. Marlow rationalizes Kurtz's "lack of restraint": "the wilderness . . . had whispered to him things about himself which he did not know," a whisper that "echoed loudly within him because he was hollow at the core." It is questionable whether Marlow is less hollow when, at the end of the work, he attempts in "fright" to lie about Kurtz's last words, "The horror! The horror!" The experience of race is now complete; even the shadowy narrator of Marlow's story is left before "the heart of an immense darkness" in which the image of Kurtz's racism looms in the consciousness of Conrad's readers and of the world.
Arendt, however, is not saying that racism or any other element of totalitarianism caused the regimes of Hitler or Stalin, but rather that those elements, which include anti-Semitism, the decline of the nation-state, expansionism for its own sake, and the alliance between capital and mob, crystallized in the movements from which those regimes arose. Reflecting on her book in 1958 Arendt said that her intentions "presented themselves" to her "in the form of an ever recurring image: I felt as though I dealt with a crystallized structure which I had to break up into its constituent elements in order to destroy it." This presented a problem because she saw that it was an "impossible task to write history, not in order to save and conserve and render fit for remembrance, but, on the contrary, in order to destroy." Thus despite her historical analyses it "dawned" on her that The Origins of Totalitarianism was not "a historical . . . but a political book, in which whatever there was of past history not only was seen from the vantage point of the present, but would not have become visible at all without the light which the event, the emergence of totalitarianism, shed on it." The origins are not causes, in fact "they only became origins- antecedents--after the event had taken place." While analyzing, literally "breaking up," a crystal into its "constituent elements" destroys the crystal, it does not destroy the elements. This is among the fundamental points that Arendt made in the chapter written in 1953 and added to all subsequent editions of The Origins of Totalitarianism (see "Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government"):
If it is true that the elements of totalitarianism can be found by retracing the history and analyzing the political implications of what we usually call the crisis of our century, then the conclusion is unavoidable that this crisis is no mere threat from the outside, no mere result of some aggressive foreign policy of either Germany or Russia, and that it will no more disappear with the death of Stalin than it disappeared with the fall of Nazi Germany. It may even be that the true predicaments of our time will assume their authentic form--though not necessarily the cruelest--only when totalitarianism has become a thing of the past.
According to Arendt the "disturbing relevance of totalitarian regimes . . . is that the true problems of our time cannot be understood, let alone solved, without the acknowledgment that totalitarianism became this century's curse only because it so terrifyingly took care of its problems" (see "Concluding Remarks" in the first edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism). The rejection of the totalitarian answer to the question of race, for instance, does not solve but reveals the problem that arises when race is viewed as the origin of human diversity. Totalitarianism's destruction of naturally determined "inferior" races or historically determined "dying" classes leaves us on an overcrowded planet with the great and unsolved political perplexity of how human plurality can be conceived, of how historically and culturally different groups of human beings can live together and share their earthly home.
Defying classification in terms of a single academic discipline such as history, sociology, political science, or philosophy, The Origins of Totalitarianism presents a startling interpretation of modern European intellectual currents and political events. Still difficult to grasp in its entirety, the book's climactic delineation of the living dead, of those "inanimate" beings who experienced the full force of totalitarian terror in concentration camps, cut more deeply into the consciousness of some of Arendt's readers than the most shocking photographs of the distorted bodies of the already dead. Such readers realized that there are torments worse than death, which Arendt described in terms of the longing for death by those who in former times were thought to have been condemned to the eternal punishments of hell. She meant this vision of hell to be taken literally and not allegorically, for although throughout the long centuries of Christian belief men had proved themselves incapable of realizing the city of God as a dwelling place for human beings, they now showed that it was indeed possible to establish hell on earth rather than in an afterlife.
Arendt added totalitarianism to the list of kinds of government drawn up in antiquity and hardly altered since then: monarchy (the rule of one) and its perversion in tyranny; aristocracy (the rule of the best) and its corruption in oligarchy or the rule of cliques; and democracy (the rule of many) and its distortion in ochlocracy or mob rule. The hallmark of totalitarianism, a form of rule supported by "superfluous" masses who sought a new reality in which they would be recognized in public, was the appearance in the world of what Arendt, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, called radical and absolute evil. Totalitarian regimes are not the "opposite" of anything: the absence of their opposite may be the surest way of seeing totalitarianism as the crisis of our times.
Totalitarianism has been identified by many writers as a ruthless, brutal, and, thanks to modern technology, potent form of political tyranny whose ambitions for world domination are unlimited. Disseminating propaganda derived from an ideology through the media of mass communication, totalitarianism relies on mass support. It crushes whoever and whatever stands in its way by means of terror and proceeds to a total reconstruction of the society it displaces. Thus a largely rural and feudal Russian Empire, under the absolutist rule of czars stretching back to the fifteenth century, was transformed first by Lenin after the October Revolution of 1917 and then by Stalin into an industrialized Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; a Germany broken after its defeat in World War I was mobilized and became the conqueror of most of Europe in the early 1940s less than a decade after Hitler's assumption of power; and in China the People's Republic, by taking the Great Leap Forward in 1958 followed by the Cultural Revolution beginning in 1966 and ending with Mao Zedong's death in 1976, expunged much of what remained of a culture that had survived for more than three thousand years.
Such achievements require total one-party governmental control and tremendous human sacrifice; the elimination of free choice and individuality; the politicization of the private sphere, including that of the family; and the denial of any notion of the universality of human rights. In diverse areas of the world where political freedom and open societies have been virtually unknown or untried, totalitarian methods have been seen to exert an ongoing attraction for local elites, warlords, and rebels. Such well-known phenomena as "brain washing," "killing fields," "ethnic cleansing," "mass graves," and "genocide," accounting for millions of victims and arising from a variety of tribal, nationalist, ethnic, religious, and economic conditions, have been deemed totalitarian in nature. Totalitarianism, moreover, is frequently employed as an abstract, vaguely defined term of general opprobrium, whose historical roots are traced to the political thought of Marx or in some instances to Rousseau and as far back as Plato. But because of what has been called its "inefficiency," which Arendt attributes to its "contempt for utilitarian motives," totalitarianism rarely occurs in the political analyses of those who consider the function of politics in terms of "utilitarian expectations." Recently, however, prominent political theorists such as Margaret Canovan in England and Claude Lefort in France have seen in the decline of communism and the diminished intensity of left and right ideological debates an opportunity for an impartial and rigorous reassessment of the concept of totalitarianism. Although Arendt may have experienced a similar need to understand Nazism after its defeat in World War II, for her impartiality was the condition of judging the irreversible catastrophe of totalitarianism as "the central event of our world."
When Arendt noted that causality, the explanation of an event as being determined by another event or chain of events which leads up to it, "is an altogether alien and falsifying category in the historical sciences," she meant that no historical event is ever predictable. Although with hindsight it is possible to discern a sequence of events, there is always a "grotesque disparity" between that sequence and a particular event's significance. What the principle of causality ignores or denies is the contingency of human affairs, i.e., the human capacity to begin something new, and therefore the meaning and "the very existence" of what it seeks to explain. It is not the "objectivity" of the historical scientist but the impartiality of the judge who perceives the existence and discerns the meaning of events, of which the antecedents can then be told in stories whose beginnings are never causes and whose conclusions are never predetermined.2 The rejection of causality in history and the insistence on the contingency, unpredictability, and meaning of events brought about not by nature but by human agency inform Arendt's judgment of the incomprehensible and unforgivable crimes of totalitarianism. In regard to such crimes the old saying "tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner" (to understand everything is to forgive everything)--as if to understand an offense, say by its psychological motive, were to excuse it--is a double "misrepresentation" of the fact that understanding seeks reconciliation. What may be possible is reconciliation to the world in which the crimes of totalitarianism were committed, and a great part of Arendt's work on totalitarianism and thereafter is an effort to understand that world. But it should be noted that the outrage that pervades her judgment is not a subjective emotional reaction foisted on a purportedly "value free" scientific analysis.3 Her anger is impartial in her judgment of a form of government that defaced the world and "objectively" belongs to that world on whose behalf she judged totalitarianism for what it was and what it meant.
Even before she wrote The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt spoke of the desperate need to tell the "real story of the Nazi-constructed hell":
Not only because these facts have changed and poisoned the very air we breathe, not only because they now inhabit our dreams at night and permeate our thoughts during the day -- but also because they have become the basic experience and the basic misery of our times. Only from this foundation, on which a new knowledge of man will rest, can our new insights, our new memories, our new deeds, take their point of departure.
The beginning called for here, if there were to be one, will arise from individual acts of judgment by men and women who know the nature of totalitarianism and agree that, for the sake of the world, it must not occur again--not only in the forms in which it has already occurred, which may be unlikely, but in any form whatsoever.
The significance of the story Arendt went on to tell and retell lies entirely in the present, and she was fully aware that her "method," a subject which she was always loath to discuss, went against the grain not only of political and social scientists but also, more importantly to her, of those reporters, historians, and poets who in distinct ways seek to preserve, in or out of time, what they record, narrate, and imagine. Reflecting later on the moment in 1943 when she first learned about Auschwitz, Arendt said: "This ought not to have happened." That is no purely moral "ought" based in ethical precepts, the voice of conscience, or immutable natural law, but rather as strong as possible a statement that there was something irremissibly wrong with the human world in which Auschwitz could and did happen.
Reconciliation to that world requires understanding only when totalitarianism is judged, not by subsuming it under traditional moral, legal, or political categories but by recognizing it as something unprecedented, odious, and to be fought against. Such judgment is possible for beings "whose essence is beginning" and makes reconciliation possible because it strikes new roots in the world. Judgment is "the other side of action" and as such the opposite of resignation. It does not erase totalitarianism, for then, thrown backward into the past, the historical processes that did not cause but led to totalitarianism would be repeated and "the burden of our time" reaccumulated; or, projected forward into the future, a never-never land ignorant of its own conditions, the human mind would "wander in obscurity."4 A quotation from Karl Jaspers that struck Arendt "right in the heart" and which she chose as the epigraph for The Origins of Totalitarianism stresses that what matters is not to give oneself over to the despair of the past or the utopian hope of the future, but "to remain wholly in the present." Totalitarianism is the crisis of our times insofar as its demise becomes a turning point for the present world, presenting us with an entirely new opportunity to realize a common world, a world that Arendt called a "human artifice," a place fit for habitation by all human beings.
Arendt's papers provide many interesting opportunities to study the development of her thought. For instance, in "The Difficulties of Understanding," written in the early 1950s, judgment is conjoined with understanding. As late as 1972, in impromptu remarks delivered at a conference devoted to her work, she associated it with the activity of thinking. But Arendt was working her way toward distinguishing judgment as an independent and autonomous mental faculty, "the most political of man's mental abilities". Although the activities of understanding and thinking reveal an unending stream of meanings and under specific circumstances may liberate the faculty of judgment, the act of judging particular and contingent events differs from them in that it preserves freedom by exercising it in the realm of human affairs. That distinction is critical for her view of history in general and totalitarianism in particular and has been adhered to in this introduction.
Arendt's judgment of totalitarianism must first and foremost be distinguished from its common identification as an insidious form of tyranny. Tyranny is an ancient, originally Greek form of government which, as the tragedy of Oedipous Tyrannos and the historical examples of Peisistratus of Athens and Periandros of Corinth demonstrate, was by no means necessarily against the private interests and initiatives of its people. As a form of government tyranny stands against the appearance in public of the plurality of the people, the condition, according to Arendt, in which political life and political freedom--"public happiness," as the founders of the American republic named it--become possible and without which they do not.
In a tyrannical political realm, which can hardly be called public, the tyrant exists in isolation from the people. Due to the lack of rapport or legal communication between the people and the tyrant, all action in a tyranny manifests a "moving principle" of mutual fear: the tyrant's fear of the people, on one side, and the people's fear of the tyrant, or, as Arendt put it, their "despair over the impossibility" of joining together to act at all, on the other. It is in this sense that tyranny is a contradictory and futile form of government, one that generates not power but impotence. Hence, according to Montesquieu, whose acute observations Arendt drew on in these matters, tyranny (which he does not even bother to distinguish from despotism, malevolent by definition, since he is concerned with public rather than private freedom) is a form of government that, unlike constitutional republics or monarchies, corrupts itself, cultivating within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Therefore, the essential impotence of a tyrannically ruled state, however flamboyant and spectacular its dying throes, and whether or not it is despotic, and regardless of the cruelty and suffering it may inflict on its people, presents no menace of destruction to the world at large.
In their early revolutionary stages of development, to be sure, and whenever and wherever they meet opposition, totalitarian movements employ tyrannical measures of force and violence, but their nature differs from that of tyrannies precisely in the enormity of their threat of world destruction. That threat has often been thought possible and explained as the total politicalization of all phases of life. Arendt saw it, and this is crucial, as exactly the opposite: a phenomenon of total depoliticalization (in German Entpolitisierung) that appeared for the first time in the regimes of Stalin after 1929 and Hitler after 1938. Totalitarianism's radical atomization of the whole of society differs from the political isolation, the political "desert," as Arendt termed it, of tyranny. It eliminates not only free action, which is political by definition, but also the element of action, that is, of initiation, of beginning anything at all, from every human activity. Individual spontaneity--in thinking, in any aspiration, or in any creative undertaking--that sustains and renews the human world is obliterated in totalitarianism. Totalitarianism destroys everything that politics, even the circumscribed political realm of a tyranny, makes possible.
In totalitarian society freedom, private as well as public, is nothing but an illusion. As such it is no longer the source of fear that in tyranny manifests itself not as an emotion but as the principle of the tyrant's action and the people's non-action. Whereas tyranny, pitting the ruler and his subjects against each other, is ultimately impotent, totalitarianism generates immense power, a new sort of power that not only exceeds but is different in kind from coercive force. The dynamism of totalitarianism negates the fundamental conditions of human existence. In the name of ideological necessity totalitarian terror mocks the appearance and also the disappearance, both the lives and the deaths, of distinct and potentially free men and women. It mocks the world that only a plurality of such individuals can continuously create, hold in common, and share. It mocks even the earth insofar as it is their natural home. The profound paradox that lies between the totalitarian belief that the eradication of every sign of humanity, of human freedom, of all spontaneity and beginning, is necessary, and the fact that its possibility is itself something new brought into the world by human beings is the core of what Arendt strove to comprehend.
According to Arendt the nature of totalitarianism is the "combination" of "its essence of terror and its principle of logicality". As "essence" terror must be total, more than a means of suppressing opposition, more than an extreme or insane vindictiveness. Total terror is, in its own way, rational: it replaces, literally takes the place of, the role played by positive laws in constitutional governments. But the result is neither lawless anarchy, the war of all against all, nor the tyrannical abrogation of law. Arendt pointed out that just as a government of laws would become "perfect" in the absence of transgressions, so terror "rules supreme when nobody any longer stands in its way" (see The Origins of Totalitarianism, chapter 12). Just as positive laws in a constitutional government seek to "translate and realize" higher transcendent laws, such as God's commandments or natural law, so totalitarian terror "is designed to translate into reality the law of movement of history or nature," not in a limited body politic, but throughout mankind.
If totalitarianism were perfected, if the entire plurality of human beings were to become one with the sole aim of accelerating "the movement of nature or history," then its essence of terror would suffice as its principle of motion (see The Origins of Totalitarianism, chapter 13). So long as totalitarianism exists in a non-totalitarian world, however, it needs the processes of logical or dialectical deduction to coerce the human mind into "imitating" and becoming "integrated" into the "suprahuman" forces of nature and history. In other words, the logic of the idea of an ideology forces the mind to move as inevitably as natural and historical processes themselves move, and against this movement "nothing stands but the great capacity of men" to interrupt those processes by starting "something new." It is not the political isolation that always prevents action, however, but the loneliness of socially uprooted, "superfluous" human beings, their loss of common sense, the sense of community and communication, which attracts them to logical explanations of all that has happened, is happening, and ever will happen. Thereby relieved of any responsibility for the course of the world, world-alienated masses are unwittingly, beneath the crust of their lives, prepared for totalitarian organization and, ultimately, domination.
Arendt concluded that Hitler and Stalin discovered that the eradication of the unpredictability of human affairs, of human freedom, and of human nature itself is possible in "the true central institution of totalitarian organizational power," the concentration camp. In concentration camps the combination of the practice of terror with the principle of logicality, which is the nature of totalitarianism, "resolves" the conflict in constitutional governments between legality and justice by ridding human beings of individual consciences and making them embodiments of the laws governing the motion of nature and history. On the one hand, in the world view of totalitarianism the freedom of human beings is inconsequential to "the undeniable automatism" of natural and historical processes, or at most an impediment to their freedom. On the other, when "the iron band of terror" destroys human plurality, so totally dominating human beings that they cease to be individuals and become a mere mass of identical, interchangeable specimens "of the animal-species man," that terror provides the movement of nature and history with "an incomparable instrument" of acceleration. Terror and logicality welded together equip totalitarian regimes with unprecedented power to dominate human beings. How totalitarian systems accomplish their inversion of political life, above all how they set about destroying human conscience and the plurality of unique human individuals, staggers the imagination and confounds the faculty of understanding.
Note:
1. As Chinua Achebe says he ought to have done (C. Achebe, "An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's Heart of Darkness" in Heart of Darkness, ed. Robert Kimbrough, 3rd ed. [New York, 1998], 256).
2. The concept of history derives from the Greek verb historein, to inquire, but Arendt found "the origin of this verb" in the Homeric histor, the first "historian," who was a judge (see Thinking, "Postscriptum"; cf. Illiad XVIII, 501).
3. Such a view, as Arendt points out, accurately describes many historical accounts of anti-Semitism, none more so than D. J. Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York, 1996).
4. The Burden of Our Time is the title of the first British edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism (London, 1951). Arendt frequently cited Tocqueville's remark in the last chapter of Democracy In America: "As the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity".
来源:http://my.opera.com/PRC/blog/totalitarianism-the-inversion-of-politic
Sep 2007
Judith Butler
The Jewish Writings by Hannah Arendt ed. Jerome Kohn · Schocken, 559 pp, $35.00
‘You know the left think that I am conservative,’ Hannah Arendt once said, ‘and the conservatives think I am left or I am a maverick or God knows what. And I must say that I couldn’t care less. I don’t think the real questions of this century get any kind of illumination by this kind of thing.’ The Jewish Writings make the matter of her political affiliation no less easy to settle. In these editorials, essays and unfinished pieces, she seeks to underscore the political paradoxes of the nation-state. If the nation-state secures the rights of citizens, then surely it is a necessity; but if the nation-state relies on nationalism and invariably produces massive numbers of stateless people, it clearly needs to be opposed. If the nation-state is opposed, then what, if anything, serves as its alternative?
Arendt refers variously to modes of ‘belonging’ and conceptions of the ‘polity’ that are not reducible to the idea of the nation-state. She even formulates, in her early writings, an idea of the ‘nation’ that is uncoupled from both statehood and territory. The nation retains its place for her, though it diminishes between the mid-1930s and early 1960s, but the polity she comes to imagine, however briefly, is something other than the nation-state: a federation that diffuses both claims of national sovereignty and the ontology of individualism. In her critique of Fascism as well as in her scepticism towards Zionism, she clearly opposes those disparate forms of the nation-state that rely on nationalism and create massive statelessness and destitution. Paradoxically, and perhaps shrewdly, the terms in which Arendt criticised Fascism came to inform her criticisms of Zionism, though she did not and would not conflate the two.
She stated the matter quite clearly in The Origins of Totalitarianism, published in 1951. Statelessness was not a Jewish problem, but a recurrent 20th-century predicament of the nation-state. What happened to the Jewish people under Hitler should not be seen as exceptional but as exemplary of a certain way of managing minority populations; hence, the reduction of ‘German Jews to a non-recognised minority in Germany’, the subsequent expulsions of the Jews as ‘stateless people across the borders’, and the gathering of them ‘back from everywhere in order to ship them to extermination camps was an eloquent demonstration to the rest of the world how really to “liquidate” all problems concerning minorities and the stateless’. Thus, she continues,
after the war it turned out that the Jewish question, which was considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved – namely, by means of a colonised and then conquered territory – but this solved neither the problem of the minorities nor the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually all other events of the 20th century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of stateless and rightless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people. And what happened in Palestine within the smallest territory and in terms of hundreds of thousands was then repeated in India on a large scale involving many millions of people.
It may well have been such views, along with her criticisms of Zionism in 1944 and 1948, that led to Gershom Scholem’s sharp allegations against Arendt in an exchange of letters in 1963, after the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem. Scholem called her ‘heartless’ for concentrating dispassionately on Eichmann’s understanding of himself as a functionary. Her text was controversial on a number of accounts. There were those who thought she misdescribed the history of the Jewish resistance under Fascism and unfairly foregrounded the collaborative politics of the Jewish Councils, and those who wanted her to name and analyse Eichmann himself as an emblem of evil. Her account of his trial, moreover, tries to debunk speculations as to his psychological motives as irrelevant to the exercise of justice. And though she agrees with the decision of the Israeli court that Eichmann is guilty and deserving of the death penalty, she takes issues with the proceedings and with the grounds on which that judgment is based. Some objected to her public criticism of the court, arguing that it was untimely or unseemly to criticise Israeli political institutions. That she finds Eichmann careerist, confused, and unpredictably ‘elated’ by renditions of his own infamy failed to satisfy those who sought to find in his motivations the culmination of centuries of anti-semitism in the policies of the Final Solution.
Arendt refused all these interpretations (along with other psychological constructs such as ‘collective guilt’) in order to establish, first, that ‘one cannot extract any diabolical or demonic profundity from Eichmann’ and that if he is in this sense ‘banal’, he is not for that reason ‘commonplace’; and, second, that accounts of his action on the basis of ‘deeper explanations’ are debatable, but that ‘what is not debatable is that no judicial procedure would be possible on the basis of them.’
Scholem went on to impugn Arendt’s personal motives: ‘In the Jewish tradition there is a concept, hard to define and yet concrete enough, which we know as Ahabath Israel: “Love of the Jewish people”. In you, dear Hannah, as in so many intellectuals who came from the German left, I find little trace of this.’ Arendt, after disputing that she was from the German left (and, indeed, she was no Marxist), replies:
You are quite right – I am not moved by any ‘love’ of this sort, and for two reasons: I have never in my life ‘loved’ any people or collective – neither the German people, nor the French, nor the American, nor the working class or anything of that sort. I indeed love ‘only’ my friends and the only kind of love I know of and believe in is the love of persons. Secondly, this ‘love of the Jews’ would appear to me, since I am myself Jewish, as something rather suspect. I cannot love myself or anything which I know is part and parcel of my own person. To clarify this, let me tell you of a conversation I had in Israel with a prominent political personality who was defending the – in my opinion disastrous – non-separation of religion and state in Israel. What [she] said – I am not sure of the exact words any more – ran something like this: ‘You will understand that, as a socialist, I, of course, do not believe in God; I believe in the Jewish people.’ I found this a shocking statement and, being too shocked, I did not reply at the time. But I could have answered: the greatness of this people was once that it believed in God, and believed in Him in such a way that its trust and love towards Him was greater than its fear. And now this people believes only in itself? What good can come out of that? Well, in this sense I do not ‘love’ the Jews, nor do I ‘believe’ in them; I merely belong to them as a matter of course, beyond dispute or argument.
Both the tone and substance of Arendt’s argument raise questions about her understanding of Jewish belonging. What did she mean by saying she was a Jew as a matter of course, beyond dispute or argument? Was she saying she was only nominally a Jew, by virtue of genetic inheritance or historical legacy, or a mixture of the two? Was she saying that she was sociologically in the position of the Jew? When Scholem calls her a ‘daughter of our people’, Arendt sidesteps the attribution of kinship but avows her belonging: ‘I have never pretended to be anything else or to be in any way other than I am, and I have never felt even tempted in that direction. It would have been like saying that I was a man and not a woman – that is to say, kind of insane.’ She goes on to say that ‘to be a Jew’ is an ‘indisputable fact of my life’ and adds: ‘There is such a thing as a basic gratitude for everything that is as it is; for what has been given and not made; for what is physei and not nomo¯.’
Being a woman and being a Jew are both referred to as physei and, as such, naturally constituted rather than part of any cultural order. But Arendt’s answer hardly settles the question of whether such categories are given or made; and this equivocation hardly makes her position ‘insane’. Is there not a making of what is given that complicates the apparent distinction between physei and nomo¯? Arendt presents herself as a Jew who can and will take various political stands, whether or not they conform to anyone else’s idea of what views a Jew should hold or what a Jew should be. Whatever this mode of belonging might be for her, it will not involve conforming to nationalist political views. Moreover, it is difficult to read her response to Scholem as anything other than an effort to make sense of, or give a particular construction to, the physei that she is. And since, in the 1930s, she had subscribed to the idea that the Jewish people were a ‘nation’, and had even dismissed those Jews who held themselves aloof from this idea, one has to wonder: what happened to Arendt’s views of the nation and of modes of cultural belonging between the 1930s and the mid-1960s?
Throughout The Jewish Writings, Arendt struggles with what it means to be Jewish without strong religious faith, and why it might be important to distinguish, as she does, between the secular and the assimilated Jew. She does, after all, mark herself as a Jew, which constitutes a failure of assimilation (the task of which is to lose the mark altogether). In an unfinished piece dated around 1939, Arendt argues that Zionism and assimilationism emerge from a common dogmatism. Assimilationists think that Jews belong to the nations that host them (the anti-Zionist philosopher Hermann Cohen wrote at the turn of the 20th century that German Jews were first and foremost German and could thrive and receive protection only within a German state), whereas Zionists think the Jews must have a nation because every other nation is defined independently of its Jewish minorities. Arendt rebukes them both: ‘These are both the same shortcoming, and both arise out of a shared Jewish fear of admitting that there are and always have been divergent interests between Jews and segments of the people among whom they live.’ In other words, living with others who have divergent interests is a condition of politics that one cannot wish away without wishing away politics itself. For Arendt, the persistence of ‘divergent interests’ does not constitute grounds for either the absorption or the separation of national minorities. Both Zionists and assimilationists ‘retain the charge of foreignness’ levelled against the Jews: assimilationists seek to rectify this foreignness by gaining entrance into the host nation as full citizens, while Zionists assume that there can be no permanent foreign host for the Jewish people, that anti-semitism will visit them in any such arrangement, and that only the establishment of a Jewish nation could provide the necessary protection and place.
Moreover, both positions subscribe to a particular logic of the nation that Arendt starts to take apart, first in the 1930s in her investigations into anti-semitism and the history of the Jews in Europe, then throughout the war years in editorials on Palestine and Israel published in Aufbau, the German-Jewish newspaper, and in her trenchant critique of the nation-state and the production of stateless persons in The Origins of Totalitarianism in the early 1950s.
Obviously, it would be an error to read her response to Scholem as an espousal of assimilationism. She was a secular Jew, but secularity did not eclipse her Jewishness so much as define it historically. She lived, as she put it, in the wake of a certain lost faith. Her experience of Fascism, her own forced emigration to France in the 1930s, her escape from the internment camp at Gurs and emigration to the US in 1941 gave her a historically specific perspective on refugees, the stateless and the transfer and displacement of large numbers of peoples. Arendt’s critique of nationalism emerged, in part, from the experience of exile and displacement that especially affected the Jews in the 1930s and 1940s, but for her, dispossession and displacement were not exclusively ‘Jewish’ problems. There was, she believed, a political obligation to analyse and oppose deportations, population transfers and statelessness in ways that refused a nationalist ethos. Hence her critique of both Zionism and assimilationism. Hence, also, the apparent nominalism of her remark to Scholem that she doesn’t ‘love’ the Jews or ‘believe’ in them, but merely ‘belongs’ to them. Here both ‘love’ and ‘believe’ are housed in quotation marks, but is it not also the generality, ‘the Jews’, to which she objects? After all, she has said she can love not a ‘people’, only ‘persons’.
What is wrong with the notion of loving the Jewish people? In the late 1930s, Arendt argued that efforts to ‘emancipate’ the Jews in 19th-century Europe were invested less in their fate than in a certain principle of progress, one that required that the Jews be thought of as an abstraction: ‘Liberation was to be extended not to Jews one might know or not know, not to the humble peddler or to the lender of large sums of money, but to “the Jew in general”.’ Just as there were exceptional Jews, such as Moses Mendelssohn, who came to stand for ‘the Jews in general’, so the ‘Jew’ came to stand for the progress of human rights. The effect, according to Arendt, was to sever the principle from the person: progressive Enlightenment opposition to anti-semitism consistently cast the ordinary Jew as noxious at the same moment as it championed the rights of the Jews in general. So when Arendt refuses to love ‘the Jewish people’, she is refusing to form an attachment to an abstraction that has supplied the premise and the alibi for anti-semitism.
Scholem’s rebuke is especially problematic since he is writing from Israel in 1963 and objecting to Arendt’s merciless account of the Israeli court procedures at the Eichmann trial. He is accusing her not only of not loving the Jewish people, but of questioning whether Israel and its courts – and perhaps also its strategies of demonisation – were working in legitimate ways. Effectively, when he refers to the Jewish people, he excludes the diasporic or non-Zionist Jew, and so rhetorically reproduces the schism within Jewish culture and politics between the self-loving and those who are not.
Arendt is clearly opposed to a Jewish nationalism founded on secular presumptions. But she doesn’t find a polity based on religious grounds any more acceptable. A just polity will extend equality to all citizens and to all nationalities: that is the lesson she learns from opposing Fascism. She worries openly about the devolution of Judaism from a set of religious beliefs into a national political identity. ‘Those Jews who no longer believe in their God in a traditional way but continue to consider themselves “chosen” in some fashion or other,’ she writes, ‘can mean by it nothing other than that by nature they are better or wiser or more rebellious or salt of the earth. And that would be, twist and turn it as you like, nothing other than a version of racist superstition.’ She claims at one point that ‘our national misery’ began when the Jews relinquished religious values: ‘Ever since then we have proclaimed our existence per se – without any national or usually any religious content – as a thing of value.’ Although she understands the struggle to survive as an indispensable aspect of being Jewish in the 20th century, she finds it unacceptable that ‘survival itself’ has trumped ideals of justice, equality or freedom.
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Arendt thought that the Jews might become a nation among nations, part of a federated Europe; she imagined that all the European nations that were struggling against Fascism could ally with one another, and that the Jews might have their own army that would fight against Fascism alongside other European armies. She argued then for a nation without territory, a nation that makes sense only in a federated form, that would be, by definition, a constitutive part of a plurality. Later she would prefer the proposal of a federated Jewish-Arab state to the established notion that the state of Israel should be based on principles of Jewish sovereignty. Indeed, ‘Jewish sovereignty’ would be a dire category mistake, since it allies a single nation with the state in ways that would inevitably produce massive injustice for minorities. ‘Palestine can be saved as the national homeland of Jews only if (like other small countries and nationalities) it is integrated into a federation,’ she wrote in 1943.
Although this is a secular political solution, in 1941 she states the rationale for it by referring to a religious parable. ‘As Jews,’ she writes, ‘we want to fight for the freedom of the Jewish people, because “If I am not for me – who is for me?” As Europeans we want to fight for the freedom of Europe, because “If I am only for me – who am I?”’ This is the famous question of Hillel, the Jewish commentator of the first century ad. Here, and elsewhere, she draws on the Jewish religious tradition to formulate political principles capable of organising the secular field of politics (which is something other than grounding a secular politics on religious principles). Arendt doesn’t quote Hillel when she writes to Scholem 22 years later – there, she refuses to offer a religious formulation of her own identity – but an echo of Hillel can be heard in the words she does use: ‘I cannot love myself or anything which I know is part and parcel of my own person’; and ‘now this people believes only in itself? What good can come out of that?’ She cannot be only for herself, for then who would she be? But if she is not for herself, who will be?
In the 1930s and early 1940s, the non-Jew Arendt has in mind is, of course, the European gentile. Later, she would make some effort to think about what ‘belonging’ might mean for Jews and Arabs who inhabit the same land, but her views throughout this early period are emphatically Eurocentric. ‘We enter this war as a European people,’ she insisted in December 1941, skewing the history of Judaism by marginalising the Sephardim and Mizrachim (mentioned as ‘Oriental Jews’ in Eichmann). A presumption about the cultural superiority of Europe pervades much of her later writings too, and is clearest in her intemperate criticisms of Fanon, her debunking of the teaching of Swahili at Berkeley, and her dismissal of the black power movement in the 1960s. She clearly does not have racial minorities in mind when she thinks about those who suffer statelessness and dispossession. She appears to have separated the nation from the nation-state, but to the degree that the conception of ‘minorities’ is restricted to national minorities, ‘nation’ not only eclipses ‘race’ as a category, but renders race unthinkable. By the same token, if the Jews are a ‘nation’ without a nation-state, does that allow for a racially and geographically dispersed conception of Jewish heritage that would include the Sephardim and the Mizrachim?
In the 1930s, national belonging is an important value for Arendt, but nationalism is noxious. Her views then vacillate during the next ten years. In 1935, she praised Martin Buber and the socialist project of the kibbutzim. In the early 1940s, she supported the Jewish emigration from Europe to Palestine, but only on the condition that Jews also fought for recognition as a ‘nation’ within Europe; at the same time, she published several editorials in which she asked that the idea of nation be separated from that of territory. She defended the proposal for a Jewish army on that basis, and strongly criticised the British government’s ‘equivocal’ relation to the Jews, as evidenced by the famous White Paper of 1939 that limited the number of Jewish refugees permitted to enter Palestine. In the late 1930s, though, she also wrote that ‘the bankruptcy of the Zionist movement caused by the reality of Palestine is at the same time the bankruptcy of the illusion of autonomous, isolated Jewish politics.’ In 1943, she worried that the proposal for a binational state in Palestine could be maintained only by enhancing the reliance of Palestine on Britain and other major powers, including the United States. Sometimes, she worried that binationalism could work only to the advantage of the Arab population and to the disadvantage of the Jews. In ‘Zionism Reconsidered’ (1944), however, she argued forcefully that the risks of founding a state on principles of Jewish sovereignty could only aggravate the problem of statelessness that had become increasingly acute in the wake of the First and Second World Wars. By the early 1950s, Arendt was arguing that Israel was founded through colonial occupation with the assistance of superpowers and on the basis of citizenship requirements that were anti-democratic. In the 1930s she had worried that the Jews were becoming increasingly stateless; in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the displacement of Palestinians made it imperative that she develop a more comprehensive account of statelessness.
In ‘Zionism Reconsidered’, she calls ‘absurd’ the idea of setting up a Jewish state in a ‘sphere of interest’ of the superpowers. Such a state would suffer under the ‘delusion of nationhood’: ‘Only folly could dictate a policy which trusts a distant imperial power for protection, while alienating the goodwill of neighbours.’ On the one hand, she is clearly anxious to find ways for Israel/Palestine to survive; on the other, she predicts that the foundations proposed for the polity will result in ruin. ‘If the Jewish commonwealth is obtained in the near future . . . it will be due to the political assistance of American Jews,’ she writes. ‘But if the Jewish commonwealth is proclaimed against the will of the Arabs and without the support of the Mediterranean peoples, not only financial help but political support will be necessary for a long time to come. And that may turn out to be very troublesome indeed for Jews in this country, who after all have no power to direct the political destinies of the Near East.’
In 1948, after the UN had sanctioned the state of Israel, Arendt predicted that ‘even if the Jews were to win the war [of independence], its end would find the . . . achievements of Zionism in Palestine destroyed . . . The “victorious” Jews would live surrounded by an entirely hostile Arab population, secluded inside ever threatened borders, absorbed with physical self-defence to a degree that would submerge all other interests and activities.’ She stated once again that partition could not work, and that the best solution would be a ‘federated state’. Such a federation, in her view, ‘would have the advantage of preventing the establishment of sovereignty whose only sovereign right would be to commit suicide.’
Arendt’s investment in the idea of federation was based on the hope that it would undercut nationalism and address the problem of statelessness. If the polity that would guarantee rights is not the nation-state, then it would be either a federation, in which sovereignty is undone through a distribution of its power, or a human rights framework that would be binding on those who collectively produced it. Rights do not belong to individuals, in Arendt’s view, but are produced in concert through their exercise. This post-metaphysical view was appropriate to the post-national federation she imagined for the Jews of Europe in the late 1930s, which is why a Jewish army could represent the ‘nation’ of Jews without any presumption of state or territory. It was also what she came to imagine in 1948 for Jews and for Palestinians, in spite of the founding of the state of Israel on nationalist premises and with claims of Jewish sovereignty. She can be faulted for naivety, but not for her prescience in predicting the recurrence of statelessness and the persistence of territorial violence.
Arendt could be said to have embraced a diasporic politics, centred not on a Jewish homeland but on the rights of the stateless. To read her now is to be reminded of the passages in Edward Said’s book Freud and the Non-European where he suggests that Jews and Palestinians might find commonality in their shared history of exile and dispossession, and that diaspora could become the basis of a common polity in the Middle East. Said sees the basis of solidarity, in part, as the ‘irremediably diasporic, unhoused character of Jewish life’, which aligns it ‘in our age of vast population transfers’ with ‘refugees, exiles, expatriates and immigrants’. If Arendt sometimes argues for home and for belonging (though she does this less frequently over time), it is not to call for a polity built on those established ties of fealty. A polity requires the capacity to live with others precisely when there is no obvious mode of belonging. This is the vanquishing of self-love – the movement away from narcissism and nationalism – which forms the basis for a just politics that would oppose both nationalism and those forms of state violence that reproduce statelessness and its sufferings.
Arendt’s opposition to the dispossessions that afflict any and every minority represents a departure for Jewish thinking about justice. Her position does not universalise the Jew, but opposes the sufferings of statelessness regardless of national status. That the ‘nation’ continues to restrict her conception of the dispossessed minority is clear, and she leaves unanswered a set of important questions: is there an ‘outside’ to every federated polity? Must a federation assume ‘sovereignty’ in the context of international relations? Can international relations be organised on the basis of federative politics and, if so, can international federations enforce their laws without recourse to sovereignty?
We have become accustomed over recent years to the argument that modern constitutions retain a sovereign function and that a tacit totalitarianism functions as a limiting principle within constitutional democracies. Giorgio Agamben’s reading of Carl Schmitt pays particular attention to the exercise of sovereign power to create a state of exception that suspends constitutional protections and rights of inclusion for designated populations within established democratic polities. Arendt’s Jewish Writings offer a valuable counter-perspective. Although Agamben is clearly indebted to Arendt’s The Human Condition in his elaboration of ‘bare life’ (the life which, jettisoned from the polis, is exposed to raw power), it is the nation-state rather than sovereignty that is Arendt’s focus in her work on totalitarianism. By insisting that statelessness is the recurrent political disaster of the 20th century (it now takes on new forms in the 21st), Arendt refuses to give a metaphysical cast to ‘bare life’. Indeed, she makes it quite clear in The Origins of Totalitarianism that the ostensible ‘state of nature’ to which displaced and stateless people are reduced is not natural or metaphysical at all, but the name for a specifically political form of destitution.
Adalah, ‘the legal centre for Arab minority rights in Israel’, recently proposed a ‘democratic constitution’ that starts out not with the question, ‘Who is a Jew?’, but with the question, ‘Who is a citizen?’ Although it does not seek to adjudicate on what establishes the legitimate territory of this state, it does propose a systematic separation of nation and state, and so resonates with an Arendtian politics. Arendt’s idea of a federated polity is not the same as prevailing pluralist modes of multiculturalism, but it does posit a political way of life that is not merely a fractious collection of sovereign cultural identities, but disperses sovereignty, nationalism and individualism alike into new forms of social and political co-existence. Hopeful, perhaps naive, but not for that reason something we can permanently do without – at least not without the ceaseless territorial violence that Arendt warned against.
Judith Butler, Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at Berkeley, is writing a book on the critique of state violence in Jewish thought.
Jul 2007
Hannah Arendt的《极权主义的起源》第二部分《帝国主义》,蔡英文译本
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